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unmanned aerial system to identify, discriminate, and engage potential surface threats to 
off-shore oil platforms. The intent of the research effort was to identify how US maritime 
forces are presently deployed to protect off-shore oil platforms from sabotage, takeover, 
or destruction and to determine if an unmanned aerial system could be utilized to enhance 
that effort and perhaps reduce the manpower requirements.  While numerous possible 
threats exist including aerial and sub-surface attack, the present study concentrated on 
surface threats. 
A disciplined systems engineering approach was utilized to determine the most 
cost-effective solution that meets key stakeholder requirements for identifying, engaging, 
and neutralizing potential threats in a time-critical manner through either lethal or non-
lethal means.  The initial capability requirements are decomposed into functions to be 
performed and the functions are evaluated through consideration of either fixed-wing, 
rotary-wing, or lighter-than-air platforms using standard systems engineering tools and 
methods to determine the most cost-effective solution that meets stakeholders needs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Global terrorist threats targeted at oil production and distribution facilities are a 
clear and present danger.  The United States along with the global economy depends on 
the secure use of the world’s oceans, including mining of resources and their safe 
transportation to market.  As evident in the 2010 oil platform disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico caused by accident, a deliberate attack by a determined enemy can cause 
significant environmental and economic damage to the United States or its allies and the 
global economy.  Therefore, an urgent need is required for the capability to provide 
continuous, all-weather, autonomous protection of domestic and foreign oil platforms to 
ensure against an attack which could cause similar calamity.   
This project was initiated to investigate a potential technological material solution 
to counter present and future threats to the US national or global oil production and 
distribution infrastructure which has been identified as a prime terrorist target.  Due to the 
documented threats to the oil platform infrastructure, the Variable-mode Unmanned 
Long-range Tracking Unit for Reconnaissance & Elimination (VULTURE) team was 
formed to develop an affordable technology based solution to protect and defend off-
shore oil platforms.  This research team includes select members of the second cohort of 
the Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) program offered by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in conjunction with the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR). 
The VULTURE team conducted several mission scenarios and considered many 
possible engagement strategies and responses.  Originally these responses included 
airborne, surface, and sub-surface threats to both domestic and foreign oil platforms.  The 
resultant solution space quickly became too unwieldy and unrealistic to be considered in 
the time frame and within the constraints and the desires of the MSSE program.  
Therefore, the VULTURE team prioritized the threats, engaged stakeholders to determine 
their immediate needs and wants, and focused on how to identify, track, and neutralize 
surface threats to the oil platforms in waters outside the continental US by use of an 
unmanned aerial system.  The determination of specific type of air platform, its technical 
performance, payload capability, and cost consideration are the subjects of this report. 
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This paper describes a potential material solution for the utilization of an 
unmanned aerial system to identify, discriminate, and engage potential surface threats to 
off-shore oil platforms. The intent of the research effort was to identify how US maritime 
forces are presently deployed to protect off-shore oil platforms from sabotage, takeover, 
or destruction and to determine if an unmanned aerial system could be utilized to enhance 
that effort and perhaps reduce the manpower requirements.  While numerous possible 
threats exist including aerial and sub-surface attack, the present study concentrated on 
surface threats. 
A disciplined systems engineering approach was developed and utilized to 
determine the most cost-effective solution that meets key stakeholder requirements for 
identifying, engaging, and neutralizing potential threats in a time-critical manner through 
either lethal or non-lethal means.  As detailed in the report, our systems engineering 
methodology included the steps of:  define the problem, develop a concept of operations, 
develop the requirements, identify a concept of alternatives, and through analysis develop 
a solution system architecture that could potentially address the problem.  With feedback 
from the stakeholder, this analysis is substantiated as a potential solution to the problem.  
The initial capability requirements were decomposed into functions to be performed and 
the functions were evaluated through consideration of unmanned aerial systems 
consisting of either fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or lighter-than-air platforms using standard 
systems engineering tools and methods to determine the most cost-effective solution that 
meets stakeholders needs.  Architectural views and functional block diagrams are 
provided which meet stakeholder requirements and a preferred solution is provided along 
with recommendations for further research.  We concluded that a rotary-wing unmanned 
aerial system would be the best overall performer to accomplish the specific mission of 






















As detailed in the National Strategy for Maritime Security “The safety and 
economic security of the United States (US) depends upon the secure use of the world’s 
oceans [1].”  Further explanation from that document cite that “the President directed 
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to lead the Federal effort to develop a 
comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime Security…[1]”  Furthermore the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as 
directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, are directed to “identify and prioritize 
United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist 
attacks [2].”  This Presidential directive instructs the federal departments and agencies to 
“work with foreign countries and international organizations to strengthen the protection 
of United States critical infrastructure and key resources [2].”  As a consequence of those 
requirements, US maritime forces are presently engaged in the defense of off-shore oil 
platforms in the Persian Gulf and other waters.  It is a labor-intensive effort requiring the 
capability to identify and quickly discriminate any approaching vessel to determine if 
their intent is to do harm or merely passing by. 
This project was initiated to investigate a potential technological material solution 
to counter present and future threats to the US national or global oil production and 
distribution infrastructure which has been identified as a prime terrorist target.  Oil 
Platforms (OPLAT) fall under the ‘energy sector’ as identified under the “Critical 
Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 [3]”.  Therefore, based on the core maritime power 
projection goals [1] and the documented threats to the OPLAT infrastructure, the 
Variable-mode Unmanned Long-range Tracking Unit for Reconnaissance & Elimination 
(VULTURE) team was formed to develop an affordable technology based solution to 
protect and defend off-shore based OPLATs.  This research team includes select 
members of the second cohort of the Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) 
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program offered by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in conjunction with the Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). 
The VULTURE team conducted several mission scenarios and considered many 
possible engagement strategies and responses including airborne, surface, and sub-
surface threats to both domestic and foreign OPLATs.  The resultant solution space 
quickly became too unwieldy and unrealistic to be considered in the time frame and 
within the constraints and the desires of the MSSE program.  Therefore, the VULTURE 
team prioritized the threats, engaged numerous stakeholders to determine their immediate 
needs and wants, and focused on how to identify, track, and neutralize surface threats to 
OPLATs in waters outside the continental US (OCONUS) by use of an Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS).  The determination of specific type of air platform, its technical 
performance, payload capability, and cost consideration are the subjects of this report. 
The common Command, Control, and Communication (C3) ground station system 
which could be utilized by the VULTURE air vehicle was the subject of the first 
NAVAIR cohort and each variant of the proposed VULTURE air vehicle is planned to be 
fully compliant with their recommended architecture.  The initial maritime 
Electrical/Optical and Infrared (EO/IR) payloads which could be employed by each 
variant of a VULTURE air vehicle have also previously been researched by NAVAIR 
and will be discussed in later sections of the report. 
 
B. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Project intention 
Threats to oil production and distribution facilities are a clear and present danger.  
As evident in the 2010 Oil Spill disaster (Figure 1 from [4]) in the Gulf of Mexico caused 
by an accident, a deliberate attack by a determined enemy can cause significant 
environmental and economic damage to the US or its allies and the global economy. 
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Figure 1:  Gulf of Mexico 2010 Oil Spill 
Therefore, the capability to provide a continuous, all-weather protection of 
domestic and foreign OPLATs is required to ensure the safe and reliable provision of 
petroleum to consumers.  The employment of a UAS to accomplish that mission seems to 
be a practicable approach, and is an important objective of this research. 
2. Areas of research to investigate 
What functions, subsystems, and components are required for the VULTURE 
system to achieve the ability to detect, engage and neutralize surface threats in a time-
critical environment and allow for successful defense of OPLATs? 
What Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) should be used to determine the value of 
the VULTURE system to perform its intended mission? 
What Measures of Suitability (MOS) should be established to ensure successful 
operation in intended environment? 
How do we judge success (Number of successful attacks vice thwarted attacks / 




C. CAPSTONE PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
1. Scoping and Bounding the Project 
The initial focus of this project was intended to cover multiple off-shore OPLATs 
in both the continental US and OCONUS waters subjected to a variety of threats to 
include air, water surface, and sub-surface attacks.  However, due to limitations of time 
and the vast solution space which such considerations would necessarily involve, it was 
determined by the VULTURE team and our NPS and NAVAIR advisors that the project 
would concentrate on the ability of a UAS system to provide viable protection for 
OCONUS OPLATs against only surface threats utilizing both lethal and non-lethal 
means.  Viability of the system is determined by the intended core stakeholders. 
2. Project Team 
The team members were from a broad spectrum at NAVAIR and contained a 
wealth of experience as detailed in Appendix B, Table 23.  Current and former personnel 
from Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) were included amongst 
the team members and for the purpose of this project will be listed with their coworkers 
as under NAVAIR. 
3. Systems Engineering Methodology 
The systems engineering methodology is detailed in Figure 2.  The Systems 
Engineering ‘V model’ was adapted from Blanchard and Fabrycky [5] to meet the needs 
of the VULTURE team.  The project focuses on the left hand of the V model, highlighted 
in Figure 2 in red, and compares to the adapted methodology utilized by the VULTURE 
team composed of the blue ‘waterfall’ pattern also included in Figure 2.  This process 
was determined by group input to adequately address the goal to develop an affordable 
technology based solution to protect and defend off-shore OPLATs.  It was determined 
that the VULTURE team would interact with the stakeholder to: learn about the situation, 
bracket the problem, develop/understand the concept of operations, develop and prioritize 
the requirements prior to developing a concept of alternatives and eliminating through 
various analyses including modeling and simulation.  Then the VULTURE team could 
conclude and recommend a possible or preferred solution.  The structure of the report 















Does the Solution answer the problem?
 
Figure 2: Systems Engineering Method 
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An important tool used as part of our methodology is Quality Functional 
Deployment (QFD).  The need to clearly link stakeholder input to requirements, design 
characteristics, system functions, operational objectives, and components of the physical 
architecture is met through utilization of a complementary set of QFD matrices.  
Additionally, our use of QFD shows clearly the relative value of each of these 
requirements and functions, allowing for significant stakeholder input.  These QFD 
matrices are described in thorough detail beginning in section IIIE. 
Table 1: Systems Engineering Methodology relation to Report Structure 
VULTURE 
Approach 
Report Sections Report Subsections 
Introduction 
- Background 
- Objective and Research Questions 
- Capstone Project Organization Problem 
Statement 
Initial Research 
- Problem Statement 
- Identification of Stakeholders 






- Capability Needs Statement 
- Operational Concept and OV-1 
- Stakeholder Inputs 
- Requirements vs. Design Characteristics 
- Design Characteristics vs. Functions 
- Functions vs. Forms 
- Mission Analysis 
- Operational Activity Model 







- Concept Alternatives and Evaluation in 
Terms of System Measures Of 
Effectiveness (MOE) 
- Morphological Matrix 
- Performance Rating 
- Risk Analysis 
- Cost Rating 
Synthesis 
- Bang vs. Buck 
- Model and Simulation 





- Select Preferred Concept Alternative 
- Recommendations 
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II. INITIAL RESEARCH 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security [1] details several threats in the 
maritime domain.  Specific to terrorism it describes several ‘effective attack capabilities.’  
These capabilities include “…explosives-laden suicide boats and light aircraft; merchant 
and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or 
offshore platform…[1].”  The Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations in 
Theater, as listed in the U.S. Navy Maritime Expeditionary Security Force Concept of 
Operations [6], further defines the various threats to specific levels in detail.  A summary 
review that defines the levels is listed in Table 2. 
Table 2: Threat Level and composition 
 Typical Threats Typical Tactics 
Level 
I 
Enemy agents, terrorists whose primary 
mission include espionage, sabotage, 
and subversion. 
Hijacking air, land, and sea vehicles for 
use in direct attacks; use of Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) and Vehicle 




Small-scale (less than company size 
equivalent) irregular forces conducting 
unconventional warfare posing a 
serious threat to military forces and 
civilians.  Attacks can cause significant 
disruptions to military operations as 
well as the orderly conduct of local 
government and services. 
Activities include operations associated 
with terrorist attacks, listed above (land, 
air, and sea vehicle hijacking)  Establish 
active espionage networks, collect 
intelligence, carry out specific missions, 
develop target lists, and conduct damage 
assessments of targets struck. 
Level 
III 
Force has the capability of projecting 
combat power by air, land, or sea, 
anywhere into the operational area. 
Examples include airborne, heliborne, 
and amphibious operations; large 
combined-arms ground force operations; 
and infiltration operations. 
 
The scope of this project was restricted to countering the surface threat.  Due to 
the limitations of on-platform Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capability, there is a limited early positive Identification (ID) capability of possible 
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surface threats which does not allow for timely and efficient protection of the OPLATs 
from potential terrorist surface vessel attacks. 
 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS  
A Stakeholder is defined as any entity or organization that benefits from 
successful implementation of the operational needs statement or is at risk if it fails.  
Stakeholders can directly or indirectly affect the system design, development and/or 
implementation. 
There are two primary stakeholder entities.  The first were conducting the mission 
of OPLAT protection in the Persian Gulf up until recently: 
 
- Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
CDR Gary Lauck, N9 (Science & Technology) COMNECC 
Charlie Sullivan, Maritime Expeditionary Group 2 (MEG-2) 
CDR John Anderson, N3 (Man, Train, & Equip) 
 
The second entity whose mission is to leverage proven UAS technology, currently 
utilized for similar mission of infrastructure protection, is: 
 
- Navy Marine Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Air Systems (PMA-263) 
LT Col John Neville, IPT Lead, 
Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS) 
 
C. STAKEHOLDER NEEDS  
Both NECC and PMA-263 described, a desire for a reliable system that has the 
ability to detect, engage and neutralize surface threats in a time-critical environment and 
allow for successful full-time defense of OPLATs [7] [8],.  They also stated a need for a 
system that has well defined MOE that can be used to determine its capabilities and its 
ability to perform its intended mission.  Additionally, they want a system with well 
defined Measures of Suitability (MOS) that will ensure successful operation in the 
intended environment. 
9 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
Through meetings and conversations with the NECC, and PMA-263, the overall 
needs of the stakeholder were determined.  These interactions developed into a 
stakeholder survey which fed the systems engineering process as form and function were 
derived from desired characteristics and requirements. 
 
B. CAPABILITY NEEDS STATEMENT  
From discussions with PMA-263 [8], there was a need to meet the threat posed to 
infrastructure, specifically OPLATs OCONUS.  Through the stakeholder needs it was 
determined that a technological solution was sought to accomplish this mission.  This led 
to a needs statement to maximize the surveillance, positive identification and efficient 
threat neutralization capabilities regarding possible surface threats while minimizing the 
manpower footprint. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND OV-1  
The OV-1 diagram for the VULTURE system, as detailed in Figure 3, describes 
both the environment and other allied systems with which the VULTURE is expected to 
interact.  These interactions, missions, and general location were gathered from the 
unclassified Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) [9], given to the project team by one of the stakeholders (NECC).  The MESF 
CONOPS document clarifies the capabilities of the MESF within the Expeditionary 
Environment far beyond the scope of this project which solely focuses on defense of 
OPLATs from surface threats.  In the OV-1 the VULTURE asset is modeled as a generic 
UAS.  The details of the airborne asset will be discussed later in this report.  As the major 
stakeholder was with Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), specifically PMA 263, 
the problem was scoped to evaluate only airborne assets in the solution.  This eliminated 
sea based, surface and subsurface, manned and unmanned assets to accomplish the 
protection of OPLATS mission. 
Variable-mode Unmanned Long-range Tracking Unit for 





















Figure 1: OV-1 of the VULTURE system (generic model UAS) 
 
A. STAKEHOLDER INPUTS  
The following section describes the empirical process used to extract top level 
requirements from the stakeholder, and to analytically transform these requirements into a top 
level system design approach that allows for proper resource allocation. 
A list of top level system requirements were collected from the stakeholders which they 










Table 3: Top Level System Requirements 
System Requirements Definition 
Efficiently and Effectively Neutralize Known 
Surface Threats 
Neutralize surface threats quickly and 
verify. 
Communicate Real Time Data stream to and from UAS. 
Conduct Surface Surveillance Detect and Locate surface contacts. 
Conduct Surface Tracking Maintain track of contacts. 
Allow a user to Determine High Priority Targets Preferred via human operator 
Allow a user to Determine Threat Neutralization 
Method 
Human initiated and controlled escalation 
of force actions. 
Conduct a Surface Target Engagement Upon direction engage target with commanded store. 
Persistent On-Station Presence Capability for extended loiter times. 
Survivability Not easily defeated by direct attack. 
Reliable Probability that UAS can perform as intended throughout its mission. 
Available Probability that the UAS is operational at the beginning of a mission. 
Transportable Has to get to the area of operations 
Interoperability Must communicate with various allied forces. 
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 
Utilize onboard sensors to provide real-
time information regarding a surface 
contact. 
 
These top level system requirements were entered into the Stakeholder Survey 
matrix shown below in Figure 4, which was in turn given to the stakeholders for reiview
and completion.  The stakeholders were asked to rank the relative importance of each 
system requirement against one particular requirement, i.e. "Conduct positive visual ID 
“surface contact.”  This requirement was chosen based on preliminary stakeholder requests,
but does not influence the results as the matrix is designed to produce the same
results no matter which requirement is chosen.   If the stakeholder felt that two 
requirements were of equal importance, a ‘1’ is highlighted in the matrix. If one 
If one requirement was deemed more important than another, a number on the more





Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Efficiently and Effectively Neutralize Known Surface Threats.
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communicate Real Time
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Conduct Surface Surviellance
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Conduct Surface Tracking
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Allow a user to Determine High Priority Targets
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Allow a user to Determine Threat Neutralization Method
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Conduct a Surface Target Engagement
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Persistent On-Station Presence
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Survivability
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Reliable
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Available
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Transportable
Conduct positive visual ID of surface contact 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability 
Stakeholder Survey
 
Figure 4: Stakeholder (PMA-263) Survey
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PMA-263 entered the ratings in the survey which provided the input to the 
Pairwise Comparison matrix.  The Pairwise comparison is essentially an expanded 
version of the Stakeholder Survey which shows each system requirement’s relative 
importance to every other system requirement, mathematically based on the stakeholder’s 
input to the survey.  The results were normalized and each requirement was given a 
relative weight of importance to the total system. 
The output of the Pairwise Comparison (in Figure 5) shows that ‘Persistent On-
Station Presence’ is the most important system requirement indicated by the stakeholders.  
This was followed in importance by ‘Interoperability’ and ‘Communicate Real Time.’ 
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Figure 5: Pairwise Comparison 
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E. QFD 1 (REQUIREMENTS VS. DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS)  
1. Overview 
In order to aid in the establishment and prioritization of Technical Performance 
Measures (TPM), a QFD model was developed.  The QFD constitutes a team approach to 
help ensure that the “voice of the customer” is reflected in the ultimate design.  The 
purpose is to establish the necessary requirements and to translate those requirements into 
technical solutions [5]. 
In the QFD 1 shown in Figure 6, the system level requirements, along with their 
associated weights from the Pairwise Comparison, were aligned with the system design 
characteristics that will be used to determine the effectiveness of the VULTURE system. 
In a combined effort by the stakeholders and the VULTURE team, a list of design 
characteristics was generated in order to translate the system requirements into 
measureable performance metrics.  The design characteristics are listed and defined in 
Table 4.      
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Table 4: Design Characteristic Definitions 
Design Characteristics Definition 
Positive Identification (ID) Percentage of contacts positively identified.
Minimize Threat Response Time Time for the system to arrive in the area of 
the threat from anywhere in the battlespace.
Minimize Manpower Footprint Reduce OPLAT protection manpower. 
Maximize Threat Deterrence Time of uninterrupted OPLAT operation. 
Transmit Track Location Data transfer rates. 
Transmit Track Speed Data transfer rates. 
Transmit Track ID Data transfer rates. 
Long Range Target Detection Successful contact detection and tracking 
within long range. 
Short Range Target Detection Successful contact detection and tracking 
within short range. 
Track Multiple Targets The number of targets that can be tracked. 
Launch Weapon on/near Target Successful acquisition of target and 
deployment of store. 
Endurance The amount of time to loiter over area. 
Launch/Recovery Time The amount of time to takeoff/land. 
Survivable Probability of UAS destruction 
Reliable Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 
Available Percentage the system is ready to operate. 
Physical Size Volume of the system/packaging. 
Weight Physical weight of the system/packaging. 
Interoperable. Ability to communicate with friendly 
forces and assets. 
 
Next, each design characteristic was given one of the following values, 
determined by its importance in supporting each requirement: 
9 – Critical 
3 – Important 
1 – Necessary 
Blank / No value – Marginal importance 
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Positively ID Surface Contact 0.091603053 0.053 9 3 3 9 1 1 1 3
Efficiently and Effectively Neutralize Known Surface Threats 0.030534351 0.018 3 1 9 9 9 3 1 9 1 1 1 1 1
Communicate Real Time 0.27480916 0.159 3 3 3 9 9 9 3 3 1 3
Conduct Surface Surviellance 0.045801527 0.026 1 3 1 1 1 1 9 9 1 3 1 1 1
Conduct Surface Tracking 0.045801527 0.026 1 1 1 9 9 9 3 3 1 1
Allow a user to Determine High Priority Targets 0.091603053 0.053 3 3 1 9 9 9 1 3 3 1 1 1
Allow a user to Determine Threat Neutralization Method 0.022900763 0.013 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 9 1 1 1
Conduct a Surface Target Engagement 0.030534351 0.018 3 9 1 9 9 9 9 9 1 1 1
Persistent on-station presence 0.366412214 0.211 9 9 3 1 1 1 9 3 3 3 3
Survivability 0.045801527 0.026 1 1 1 9
Reliability 0.183206107 0.106 9 3 3 1 3 1 9 3 3
Availability 0.183206107 0.106 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 9 3
Transportability 0.045801527 0.026 3 9 9 1
Interoperability 0.27480916 0.159 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 9
Check Sum 1.00
95 4 24 24 16 16 16 80 80 5 90 10 15 0.5 100 90 700 2,000 95
90 6 16 20 8 8 8 70 70 4 85 8 20 0.6 80 85 900 2,500 90
1.8 4.4 3.7 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.9 2.9 1.0 1.1 2.2 2.3 0.2 0.2 2.6 36.2
0.050 0.123 0.102 0.054 0.070 0.070 0.080 0.028 0.031 0.019 0.025 0.079 0.027 0.031 0.061 0.063 0.007 0.007 0.073 1.000
Critical - 9                      
Important - 3                









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
 
Figure 6: QFD 1 
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Similar to the Pairwise Comparison, a normalized relative weight was calculated 
for each design characteristic in QFD 1.  The output shows that ‘Minimize Threat 
Response Time’ is the most critical design characteristic, followed by ‘Minimize 
Manpower Footprint.’ 
Notional goal and threshold values were developed for each of the design 
characteristics listed in QFD 1 to support the initial system development process.  The 
goal and threshold values can also be found in Figure 6.  Many of the values were chosen 
based on a number of metrics for various UAS in size Groups 2-4 (Figure 7) so not to 
limit or exclude, but include as many solutions as possible.  These goal and threshold 
values are mostly speculative, and can be negotiated and modified during the concept 
development stage of the program.  Some of the metrics worth discussing are the ones 
that were determined to be a high priority by the stakeholder. 
2. Analysis  
The highest priority selected by the stakeholder was Minimizing Threat Response 
Time, which was determined to be the amount of time it takes for the system to arrive in 
the area of the threat from anywhere in the battlespace.  In order to determine the speed 
of the UAS necessary to satisfy the stakeholder’s requirements, a number of scenarios 
were developed by the VULTURE team that represent what the system will likely 
encounter as defined by the concept of operations; the scenarios were also used in the 
modeling and simulation of the system.  In one scenario, a threat would enter a 5 nautical 
mile (nm) radius of the OPLATs exactly 180 degrees, and 10 nm away from the UAS.  If 
the threat is traveling at a speed of 40 knots (kts), then it would take it 7.5 minutes to 
reach the OPLATs assuming constant bearing, decreasing range.  The threshold value of 
6 minutes for the UAS to intercept was chosen because at that time, the threat would be 1 
nm from the platform and that should give the system enough time to acquire, track and 
eliminate the threat.  This translates to a speed requirement of 60 kts for the UAS, which 
is well within the operating ranges for most of the Group 2-4 UAS; so realistically the 




Figure 7: UAS Groups from PMA-263 
A concern of the team was to Minimize or Reduce the Manpower Footprint to 
protect OPLATs.  At first, saving man hours per day was believed to be easily modeled.  
Reducing security personnel by incorporating the VULTURE system seemed 
straightforward.  However, the team discovered that the system allows for the possible 
reduction of one type of personnel (e.g. security guards) yet it may lead to an increase of 
another type of personnel (e.g. maintenance and UAS operators).  This situation was 
compounded by the sensitive nature of the mission, and therefore a threshold value for 
manpower footprint or man hours per day was unable to be determined as the stakeholder 
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(NECC) was incapable on commenting about the specifics of OPLAT defense currently 
conducted OCONUS. 
The team was given background information in the form of the unclassified 
MESF CONOPS [9].  Contained within the CONOPS were details that did prove useful 
in understanding the variety of missions, employment of forces, and organization of the 
MESF.  Deployment of the MESF will commonly be of squadron size, while smaller 
elements (e.g. a security team) are possible depending on the mission.  The CONOPS 
mentions that the smaller elements are not self sustaining and would require support.  
Teams make up sections that make up detachments.  There are different types of 
detachments described in the CONOPS that are relevant to the project, and three were 
included in our design: 1 Communications Detachment, 1 Sensor Detachment, and 1 
Security Detachment.  Each detachment has its own chain of command: Officer In 
Charge (OIC), Assistant Officer In Charge (AOIC), and Senior Enlisted (SEL).  Their 
breakdown is listed in Table 5. 
Table 5: MESF Detachment Personnel 
Detachment Communication Sensor Security 
OIC 1 1 1 
AOIC  1 1 
SEL  1 1 
Personnel 15 57 72 
Total 16 60 75 
 
Although each of these detachments can be further subdivided, it is dependent on 
the mission requirement.  Therefore at most 151 personnel would be consumed with 
protecting a number of OPLATs (exact number unknown).  The goal then is to 
demonstrate through analysis that the VULTURE UAS can integrate into the MESF 
structure and decrease the number of deployed personnel.  Many of the UAS in Group 2-
4 can operate for at least 8 hours, which could translate to a reduced number of overall 
personnel still required to protect the OPLATs. 
Transmitting Data was another high priority for the stakeholder (Interoperability 
and Communicate Real Time in Figure 5), so a threshold value of 8 Mb/sec was chosen 
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to allow sufficient bandwidth for streaming video and uninterrupted data flow between 
the UAS and a ground control station. 
As mentioned the design characteristic of interoperability was rated highly by the 
stakeholder.  Therefore to fulfill that requirement, the VULTURE system shall be able to 
operate across multiple services and interest groups to satisfy the Joint Interoperability 
Test Command (JTIC) certification requirements.  Specific requirements are determined 
by JTIC, and depend on current technology levels.  For this reason, the interoperability 
threshold was set at 90% with an objective of 95%, but would be finalized upon JTIC’s 
feedback. 
Reliability and Availability of the VULTURE system was also a significant factor.  
These characteristic metrics were set to values comparable to some of the DoD’s current 
UAS.  The reliability of the UAS is expressed in MTBF, which is defined as the ratio of 
hours flown to the number of maintenance-related cancellations encountered.  In QFD 1, 
the MTBF goal and threshold values are 100 and 80 hours, respectively.  The Operational 
Availability (Ao) of the UAS is defined as ‘the probability that the system will operate 
when called upon in an operational environment [5].’  Both the weight and physical size 
metrics are based on the weight and size of current Group 2-4 UAS.  The goal and 
threshold values for weight are 2000 lb and 2500 lb, respectively. 
A relatively high threshold value of 90% with a goal value of 95% was selected 
for Positive target ID because it’s important that the VULTURE system and user is able 
to discern between a threat and a friendly contact in order to prevent inadvertent 
elimination of a non-hostile craft (e.g. civilian casualties).  This also ties to the ability of 
the system to be able to launch weapons on or near the target.  In order for the system to 
be effective, it must ultimately be able to eliminate or deter a threat, so reasonably high 
goal and threshold values (e.g. 85% & 90%) for launching weapons on/near a target were 
set. 
Since the Survivability of the UAS against rockets, missiles and small arms fire is 
of little concern to the stakeholder, fairly high probability of kill given a hit (Pk/h) values 
were established for the system, which translates to a low probability of survival if the 
VULTURE is hit by a threat due to a relatively large vulnerable area.  Because the UAS 
will normally be operating at altitudes outside the range of small arms fire, the 
22 
probability of the VULTURE being hit is low, so it will have a high probability of 
survival.  Since the UAS will have minimal survivability systems constraints placed upon 
it, the overall weight will be lower, which allows for trade space in other areas. 
Short and Long Range Target Detection were not rated very highly either, so the 
threshold and goal values were set to 70% and 80% respectively so it would not become a 
show-stopper in the development of the system.  The stakeholder wanted the system to be 
able to simultaneously track multiple targets, so the threshold and goal values were set to 
4 and 5 targets, respectively. 
The last design characteristic for the system is Launch and Recovery Time.  Since 
the system will use multiple UAS to provide persistent surveillance, one UAS will most 
likely be in the air when a second one is launched, which makes this metric a low 
priority.  Threshold and goal values of 20 and 15 minutes were set for the launch and 
recovery of the VULTURE system. 
 
F. QFD 2 (DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS VS. FUNCTIONS) 
In the QFD shown in Figure 8, the system design characteristics, along with their 
associated weights from QFD 1, were aligned with the system level functions required of 
the VULTURE system.  This step on the QFD model provided the traceability between 
the system requirements and critical system components.  A list of top-level functions 
was developed by the stakeholders and VULTURE team members.  The top-level 
functions are: Neutralize Surface Threat, Perform Command & Control (C2), Conduct 
Surface Surveillance, and Maintain On-Station Presence.  Neutralization of the Surface 
Threat is defined as deterring or destroying a surface contact as it approaches the 
OPLATS according to the Rules Of Engagement (ROE) established by the relevant 
command.  C2 is almost a misnomer as the UAS is receiving instructions and relaying 
information.  The UAS itself is not exercising C2 but operating under human control.  
The Conduct of Surface Surveillance is closely related to Maintain On-Station Presence 
which are interrelated as the UAS must be on station to accomplish the surveillance.  The 
surveillance will be accomplished through the utilization of onboard sensors.  On-Station 
Presence will be maintained by a ‘loiter ability’ for example a ‘maximum endurance’ 
capability in the performance of an engine onboard the UAS. 
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Each function was given one of the following values by the stakeholder, 
determined by its importance in implementing each design characteristic: 
9 – Critical 
3 – Important 
1 – Necessary 
Blank / No value – Marginal importance 
In the same manner as the previous QFD, a normalized relative weight was 
calculated for each system function in QFD 2.  The results show that the most critical 
function is “Conduct Surface Surveillance.”  This is followed closely by “Perform 
Command and Control” and “Maximize On-Station Presence.” 
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1 2 3 4
Design Characteristics Weights
Positive ID 0.050 0.050 3 9 3 3
Minimize threat response time 0.123 0.123 9 9 3 1
Minimize Manpower Footprint 0.102 0.102 3 3
Maximize threat deterrence 0.054 0.054 3 3 3 9
Transmit Track Location 0.070 0.070 3 9
Transmit Track Speed 0.070 0.070 3 9
Transmit Track ID 0.080 0.080 3 9
Long Range Target Detection 0.028 0.028 1 9 1
Short Range Target Detection 0.031 0.031 1 9 1
Track Multiple Targets 0.019 0.019 9 1 1
Launch Weapon on/near Target 0.025 0.025 3 9
Endurance 0.079 0.079 9 3
Launch/Recovery Time 0.027 0.027 3 1
Survivable 0.031 0.031 1 1
Reliable 0.061 0.061 3 1 1
Available 0.063 0.063 3 1 1
Physical size 0.007 0.007 1
Weight 0.007 0.007 1
Interoperable 0.073 0.073 3
Check Sum 1.000 1.00
Weighted Performance 3.0 3.5 3.2 1.3 11.0
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Figure 8: QFD 2
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G. QFD 3 (FUNCTIONS VS. FORMS) 
In the QFD 3 shown in Figure 9, the system functions, along with their associated 
weights from QFD 2, were aligned with the physical subsystems needed to implement the 
VULTURE system.  These subsystems were determined by the VULTURE team 
members who were Subject Matter Experts (SME) along with feedback from a 
stakeholder (PMA 263) regarding current subsystem technology needed to accomplish 
the mission. 
As before, a list of subsystems was put together by the stakeholders and the 
VULTURE team based on currently operating systems.  The various subsystems include: 
Data Processing, Weapons, Surveillance, C2, Network, Propulsion, Launch/Recovery, 
Communications, and Air Vehicle.  The Data Processing Subsystem will receive 
information from other subsystems via the Network and determine which of the 
subsystems will receive the information.  For example, Surveillance provides images of a 
contact via the Network to Data Processing which sends the information to 
Communications where the operator directs through C2 the Air Vehicle to change course 
and increase power through the Propulsion subsystem and get within Weapons range.  
This is a very simplified example but it shows the importance of the interrelationships 
that exist.  Each subsystem was given one of the following values, determined by its 
importance in implementing each system function: 
9 – Critical 
3 – Important 
1 – Necessary 
Blank / No value – Marginal importance 
In the same manner as before, a normalized relative weight was calculated for 
each subsystem in QFD 3.  The results show that the most critical subsystem is the 
Surveillance Subsystem, while the least critical is the Launch and Recovery Subsystem. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Functions Weights
Maintain On-Station Presence 0.272 0.272 9 3 3 9 1 9
Conduct Surface Surveillance 0.320 0.320 9 9 1 1 3 1 1 1
Perform Command & Control (C2) 0.288 0.288 3 1 9 9 9 3
Neutralize Surface Threat 0.120 0.120 3 9 3 3 1 3 1 3 3
Check Sum 1.00
Weighted Performance 4.1 1.1 6.0 4.1 3.8 3.8 0.4 3.5 4.0 30.8
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Figure 9: QFD 3 
As discussed previously, the process described in this section allowed the 
derivation of a top level system design approach.  The output from QFD 3, for instance, 
shows that a significant portion of effort and resources should be concentrated on 
development of the Surveillance Subsystem since that traced most directly to the 
stakeholder’s number one system requirement.  On the other hand, while the Launch and 
Recovery Subsystem is clearly important to a functioning VULTURE system, the lack of 
traceability to highly ranked system requirements shows that it is unnecessary to expend 
resources to develop more than a baseline solution. 
 
H. MISSION ANALYSIS 
Once the stakeholder needs were identified and the functions and attributes were 
assigned to them via the QFD, a mission statement was required along with a CONOPS.  
A mission analysis was performed for the VULTURE system using the Joint Operations 
Concepts Development Process (JOpsC-DP) [10].  Figure 10 shows the DoD Joint 
Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family.  The JOpsC family consists of a Capstone Concept 
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for Joint Operations (CCJO), Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint Functional 
Concepts (JFCs) and Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs).  Capabilities are developed using 
this strategy to conduct military operations. 
 
 
Figure 10: Joint Operations Concepts Family 
Each block in Figure 10 is described in Appendix C and was obtained from the 
JOpsC-DP instruction [10]. 
1. Joint Operations Concept 
Various elements of the Joint Operations Concepts are discussed throughout this 
document as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Joint Operations Concepts tracking 
Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations 
• Operational concept (paragraph C) 
• OV-1 diagram (figure 3) 
Joint Operating Concepts • CONOPS (paragraph H.5) 
• Operational activity model (paragraph I) 
Joint Functional Concepts • Functional architecture (paragraph J) 
Joint Integrating Concepts • Universal Joint Task List (paragraph H.2) 
• Universal Naval Task List (paragraph H.3) 
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The CONOPS and the OV-1 diagram lay the foundation for how the VULTURE 
system will be employed.  Furthermore, the CONOPS along with the operational activity 
model describe how a joint force commander could conduct operations using the 
VUTLURE system within a military campaign.  Additionally, the functional architecture 
identifies the operational-level capabilities required to support VULTURE operations.  
Finally, the Universal Joint Task List and the Universal Naval Task List describe specific 
missions and tasks that VULTURE would satisfy upon development and deployment. 
2. Universal Joint Task List 
Table 7 contains the elements from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) database 
[11] that were related to the Joint Capabilities Area (JCA), “Protection”.  Further details 
of the JCA definitions and elements are listed in Appendix C.  The UJTL is a library of 
tasks, which serves as a foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of 
military operations, as described by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
3500.04E [12].  It is utilized for the development of joint mission-essential task lists in 
identifying required capabilities for mission success.  The items highlighted in Table 7 
partially apply to the VULTURE system.  The UJTL is accompanied by the Universal 
Naval Task List (UNTL) [13]. 
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Table 7: Protection UJTL Elements 
 
3. Universal Naval Task List 
Finally, the mission from the UNTL that relates to the items highlighted in Table 
7 is shown in Figure 11.  Attacking surface targets at sea may be conducted with various 
types of weapons such as torpedoes, air dropped or air launched weapons, or sea mines.  
The VULTURE system for this analysis will only concentrate on surface threats. 
 
ST 6 Coordinate Theater Force Protection 
 
ST 6.1  Provide Theater Aerospace and Missile Defense 
ST 6.1.1  Process Theater Air and Space Targets 
ST 6.1.2  Provide Airspace Control Measures 
ST 6.1.3  Establish Theater Space System Force Enhancement Operations 
ST 6.1.4  Organize and Coordinate Theater Air Defense 
ST 6.1.5  Organize and Coordinate Theater Missile Defense 
ST 6.1.6  Support Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in Theater 
ST 6.1.7  Conduct Ballistic Missile Defense Operations 
ST 6.2  Coordinate Protection for Theater Forces and Means 
ST 6.2.1  Coordinate the Preparation of Strategically Significant Defenses 
ST 6.2.2  Coordinate the Removal of Strategically Significant Hazards 
ST 6.2.3  Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum 
ST 6.2.4  Ensure Acoustic Protection 
ST 6.2.5  Establish and Coordinate Positive Identification Procedures for 
Friendly Forces in Theater 
ST 6.2.6  Establish and Coordinate Security Procedures for Theater Forces and 
Means 
ST 6.2.6.1  Establish and Coordinate Counter- Reconnaissance Theater-Wide 
ST 6.2.6.2  Establish and Coordinate Protection of Theater Installations, Facilities, 
and Systems 
ST 6.2.6.3  Establish and Coordinate Protection of Theater Air, Land, and Sea 
Lines of Communications (LOCs)  
ST6.2.6.4 Establish and Coordinate Theater-Wide Counterintelligence 
Requirements 
ST 6.2.7  Conduct Personnel Recovery 
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 VULTURE System Missions
Attack Surface Targets NTA 
3.2.1.1 
Attack Submerged Targets 
NTA 3.2.1.2 
Attack Enemy Aircraft and 
Missiles  
(Offensive Counter Air) 
NTA 3.2.3  
 
Figure 11: Universal Naval Task List Missions 
4. Mission Statement 
The joint operations concepts development process was used to perform mission 
analysis for the VULTURE system.  The following mission statement was derived from 
this analysis: 
The mission of the VULTURE system is to provide defense of sea-
based oil platforms from attack by surface threats thereby 
protecting critical infrastructure and key resources of the United 
States. 
 
5. Concept of Operations 
The VULTURE system will be operated by civilian and military security forces 
from the OPLATs.  It will be operating in a maritime environment under the following 
conditions: 
- Day, night, or low-visibility (rain/fog) 
- Sea state: <4 
- Water Temperature: 32o F to 105o F 
- Clouds/precipitation (limited visibility)  
- Winds: <45 knots 
- Air Temperature: 0o F to 120 o F 
 
Security personnel will deploy the VULTURE system to provide situational 
awareness at distances from the OPLATs sufficient to neutralize detected threats.  The 
VULTURE system will perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
functions of contacts within the local area of the OPLATs within its area of operation.  It 
will process data and transmit it to provide alerts and cueing so the operators can 
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accurately ascertain friendly contacts from threats.  Once a threat is detected, the 
VUTLURE system will track the threat and deploy non-lethal and/or lethal weapons 
under human C2, until the threat is deterred or destroyed.  The operators will follow 
established ROE while in operation.  Security forces will utilize the VULTURE system to 
counter a surface threat scenario as shown in Figure 12.  A small surface vessel or 
personal water craft is maneuvered on a collision course with the OPLAT.  Its purpose is 
to either detonate explosives on impact or permit personnel to board the OPLAT.  This 
vessel would most likely appear to be a local fishing or recreational vehicle.  It may 
engage the OPLAT during the day or night; however, it would most likely occur during 
calmer sea states. 
 
Figure 12: Threat Engagement of Oil Platform 
I. OV-5 OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY MODEL  
Figure 13 shows the OV-5 diagram which describes the operations that are 
normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission.  At first, there must be a request 
for the VULTURE system.  Next, the mission to protect the forces is started.  Thirdly, 
surface contacts need to be detected, and they need to be tracked.  While they are being 
tracked, these contacts are assessed to determine whether they are threats.  Once a threat 
is determined, it is diligently tracked with the purpose of targeting.  Next, the threat is 
engaged to either deter or neutralize the threat.  Afterward, the effectiveness of this 
engagement is assessed to ensure the target is no longer a threat to the OPLATs.  Finally, 






















































Figure 13: VULTURE OV-5 Diagram 
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J. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The VULTURE system architecture was developed using the Vitech Model-
Based Systems Engineering Approach utilizing CORE 6.0.  CORE is a database program 
that catalogues the system architecting process.  Various data elements were completed in 
the folders and subfolders providing a complete element definition in a tabular, text 
format.  These data elements can be displayed in an element-relationship diagram 
replacing the textual representation of an element’s relationships with a graphic 
representation.  Output reports can be generated that align with the defined DoD 
Architectural Framework [14]. 
1. SV-4a List of System Functions 
Figure 14 shows the hierarchical view of the top-level VULTURE system 
functions.  Figure 15 through Figure 18, for better readability, show the system’s sub-
elements to the third tier of the overall VULTURE system.  The VULTURE system is 
made up of the following tier 2 functions: (1) maintain on-station presence (Figure 15); 
(2) conduct surface surveillance (Figure 16); (3) perform command and control (Figure 
17); and (4) neutralize surface threats (Figure 18), each containing a unique set of third 
tier functions.  For maintain on-station presence, the VULTURE system must be 
operating in proximity to the OPLATS performing its mission.  While operating, it 
conducts surface surveillance of the nearby area looking for contacts and or threats.  At 
the same time, an operator is always performing command and control of the system.  



































































































Figure 18: Neutralize Surface Threat Function 
2. SV-4b System Functional View 
An Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram (EFFBD) for the VULTURE 
mission is shown in Figure 19 which depicts the sequence of activities that must occur in 
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order for the system to successfully complete each of the top-level functions.  All inputs, 
outputs, and triggers are illustrated for these various functions.  The gray color boxes 
identify the inputs and outputs, and the green boxes represent the triggers.  Each of the 
functions within the EFFBD was linked to items necessary to move into the next 
functional block.  For example, the tier 2 level function “Maintain on-station presence” 
will require fuel in order to be accomplished.  Furthermore, it must provide the location 
of the air vehicle in order for the “Perform command and control” function to properly 
operate.  The trigger “Threat Assessment” is required by the “Perform command & 
































































Figure 19: VULTURE SV-4b Diagram 
3. SV-5 Operational Activity to System Function Traceability Matrix 
Table 8 contains the VULTURE system SV-5 matrix which depicts the mapping 
of operational activities to system functions and components as shown by the “X” mark 
in the blocks.  This matrix identifies the transformation of an operational need into a 
purposeful action performed by a system.  The operational activities were previously 
discussed in section I with the OV-5 operational activity model.  The function column 
37 
identifies all the top-level functions that were shown in the previous figures plus all of the 
lower-level functions too which are shown in Appendix D.  Finally, the components 
column shows which item will perform the function and operational activity thus linking 
all three areas together.  Plus, the SV-5 matrix provides the linkage from this section with 
the functions to section IV which discusses the physical architecture in detail. 
Table 8: VULTURE SV-5 Matrix 





























































































Air Vehicle Carry fuel  X        
 Carry fuel and payload      X    
 Carry sensors X         
 Carry weapons      X    
 Maintain on-station 
presence 
 X   X X    
Command and Control 
Subsystem (ISR) 
Classify contact as 
threat 
   X     X 
 Classify contact non-
threat 
   X      
 Communicate with air 
vehicle 
  X   X    
 Determine Location      X    
 Navigate per C2 
command 
     X    
 Perform command & 
control (C2) 
 X X  X X X   
 Perform positive ID of 
contact 
  X X      
Communications Communicate with 
allied forces 
    X  X   
 Communicate with 
contacts 
     X    
 Communicate with 
other platforms 
    X  X   
 Perform command & 
control (C2) 
 X X  X X X   
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    X  X   
 Perform command & 
control (C2) 
 X X  X X X   
Launch and Recovery 
Equipment 
Begin mission  X        
 Complete mission     X     
 Maintain on-station 
presence 
 X   X X    
Network Communicate with 
allied forces 
    X  X   
 Perform command & 
control (C2) 
 X X  X X X   
Propulsion Maintain on-station 
presence 
 X   X X    
Surveillance 
Subsystem 
Assess battle damage X         
 Conduct surface 
surveillance 
X X X X    X X 
 Conduct tracking        X X 
 Detect surface 
contacts 
  X       
 Report contact 
bearing 
       X X 
 Report contact 
position 
       X X 
 Report contact speed        X X 
Weapons Subsystem 
(anti-surface) 
Destroy threat      X    
 Neutralize surface 
threat 
X     X    
 Release weapon      X    
 Select weapon      X    
 Warn threat      X    
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4. Conclusion 
The VULTURE system architecture was developed using the Vitech CORE 6.0 
software program which was effectively used to identify top-level functions and then 
decompose them into lower levels.  Interrelationships between the functions, 
components, and operational activity were shown. 
 
K. INTERFACE 
1. SV-4c Logical Interface View 
A N2 diagram is shown in Figure 20 for the VULTURE system functions.  The 
top-level functions are aligned diagonally from top left to bottom right.  The inputs and 
outputs of the functions are also identified going horizontally between the functions.  
Each of these top-level functions has inputs and outputs going between them which show 
their interrelationships.  For example, the function “Maintain on-station presence” will 
input the item “Payload”.  It will output “Air Vehicle Location” which will input into the 
“Perform Command & Control (C2)” function.  The function “Conduct Surface 
Surveillance” will input the item “Global Positioning Data” and will output the item 
“Track Vector” which goes to the “Perform Command & Control (C2)” function.  The 
function “Neutralize surface threat” will receive the input “Weapon selection” from the 
“Perform Command & Control (C2)” function and it will output the item “Weapon”.  
Furthermore, it will provide an output of “Weapon Released” which will be reported back 











































































Weapons Subsy...  
Figure 20: VULTURE N2 Diagram 
2. Level 0 Diagram 
An Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF) level 0 diagram for the 
VULTURE system is shown in Figure 21.  The top-level function “Conduct VULTURE 
mission” is shown with its inputs on the top, outputs on the right side, and physical 
support on the bottom of the figure.  The input “Request for VULTURE support” is the 
trigger which starts the system.  The physical “VULTURE System” supports the mission.  
Finally, the output of the system is that the threat is deterred.  Inputs and outputs from the 
system are identified along with the signals passed between the various top-level 
functions.  A decomposition of these top level functions into IDEF level 1 diagrams is 




Figure 21: VULTURE Functional IDEF0 Diagram 
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IV. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. METHOD 
The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the VULTURE system was conducted by 
the team during the design and analysis phase.  Solutions for the AoA were generated 
based on the engineering and programmatic experience of the team members in specific 
areas, stakeholder input, research of published materials, and speaking with SME of 
specific types of subsystems and components (e.g. EO/IR etc.). 
An air vehicle system was chosen as the starting point for this analysis.  As 
mentioned previously, no analysis was conducted regarding a surface or subsurface 
vessel (manned or unmanned) for this mission.  The VULTURE system is intended to be 
developed as a UAS which can provide persistent ISR capability and, ultimately, a 
weapons-employment response through the use of lethal and/or non-lethal engagement of 
threats to protect existing OCONUS OPLATs.  This system is intended to enhance the 
efforts of the Navy and Coast Guard which are currently protecting allied and host nation 
OPLATs around the world.  Having a UAS that is able to provide the above capabilities 
will at least increase the efficiency of the OPLAT mission and at most lessen the demand 
on maritime forces. 
Ultimately, the goal of the VULTURE system team is to recommend a 
satisfactory system that can meet the schedule and budget constraints and will be 
developed and employed by those charged with the task of OCONUS OPLAT defense.  
Additionally, the goal is also to provide for future growth of capability through upgrades 
and incremental technology insertions.  The initial efforts included: 
- Evaluating/researching known systems  
- Assessing unconventional/unique, unproven solutions 
- Continuous reevaluation of requirements through stakeholder feedback 
The first step of this process was to identify components that would perform the 
functions previously discussed in paragraph J of section III.  Multiple components were 
identified and analyzed in order to compare each other to determine the best solution.    
Finally, the relative cost of these alternatives was evaluated to assess which configuration 
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provided the most performance with least cost.  The details of this process and 
methodology will be discussed in further sections. 
1. Mapping Components from Functions 
The mapping of functions to components was first identified in Table 8. They are 
presented in hierarchical format beginning with the top-level VUTURE system shown in 
Figure 22 followed by the first-tier and second-tier components in Figure 23 through 
Figure 25.  For example, “Weapons Subsystem” is the first-tier component underneath 
the VULTURE system, and it is composed of two second-tier components “Lethal” and 
“Non-lethal”.  As part of this AoA, various concept alternatives for the first-tier and 
second-tier components are compared with each other to determine a more optimum 
solution.  Concept alternatives for these components are identified and discussed in 













































































































Figure 25: Component Hierarchy breakdown third set 
2. Concept Alternatives 
The VULTURE system functions can be accomplished through a variety of 
airborne unmanned systems with a multitude of onboard sensing technology and through 
different ground stations.  Our team focused on the various air vehicle types for this AoA 
(e.g. rotary wing, fixed wing, and lighter than air).  For detailed information regarding 
sensor packages and surveillance subsystems see Market Survey for NAVAIR PMA-263 
Sea Scout Program TR/07/805/059, [15].  For a detailed analysis of a UAS ground 
control station/C2 system see Proposed Functional Architecture and Associated Benefits 
Analysis of a Common Ground Control Station for Unmanned Aircraft Systems [16]. 
 
B. CONCEPT ALTERNATIVES AND EVALUATION IN TERMS OF 
SYSTEM MOES 
Table 9 shows the MOEs which were initially identified in Figure 6 (e.g. QFD 1) along 
with an associated metric.  Our AoA assigns these MOEs to the various first-tier and 
second-tier components as shown in Figure 26 and Figure 27, form components column 
and sub-component column, respectively.  Next, various concept alternatives were listed 
for these MOEs.  For example the “Data Processing Subsystem” will be formed by the 
sub-components of “operating system” and “data storage”.  The concept alternatives for 
the “operating system” sub-component are Windows, Unix, and Solaris.    Color coding 
was used to signify the effectiveness of these alternative concepts in relation to the MOE.  
Green symbolizes highly effective, yellow symbolizes moderately effective, and red 
symbolizes least effective options relative to each other.  This ranking was assigned using 
inputs from SME feedback.
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Table 9: Measures of Effectiveness 
TITLE METRIC 
Positive ID Probability of identification, % 
Minimize threat response time Time to intercept, minutes 
Minimize Manpower Footprint Man-Hours required, hours 
Maximize threat deterrence OPLAT uptime, hours 
Transmit Track Location Data rate, Mb/sec 
Transmit Track Speed Data rate, Mb/sec 
Transmit Track ID Data rate, Mb/sec 
Long Range Target Detection Probability of detection, % 
Short Range Target Detection Probability of detection, % 
Track Multiple Targets Count, number 
Launch Weapon on/near target Probability of kill, % 
Endurance Flight-hours, hours 
Launch/Recovery Time Time to launch/recover, minutes 
Survivable Probability of kill, % 
Reliable MTBF, hours 
Available Availability, % 
Physical size Logistics footprint, square-feet 
Weight Mass, pounds 




Form Components Sub-Component MOE/MOP
Data Processing Subsystem
Operating System Window s Unix Solaris




Data Storage Hard Drive Flash Drive CD/DVD





Lethal rockets guns missiles
Maximize threat deterrence
Launch Weapon on Target
Physical size
non-lethal visual audio electromagnetic
Maximize threat deterrence
Launch Weapon near Target
Physical size
Surveillance Subsystem
Active RADAR IFF Sonar
Long Range Surface Target Detection
Short Range Surface Target Detection
Track Multiple Surface Targets
Passive IR EO ESM
Long Range Surface Target Detection
Short Range Surface Target Detection
Track Multiple Surface Targets
Command and Control Subsystem (ISR)











Figure 26: Concept Alternatives Analyzed against MOE 
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Form Components Sub-Component MOE/MOP
Netw ork
C2 Node Link-11 Link-16 IP
Interoperable
Reliable
Minimize threat response time
Air Vehicle Node Link-11 Link-16 IP
Interoperable
Reliable
Minimize threat response time
Propulsion




Minimize threat response time
Endurance





launch platform ship land oil platform
Launch Time
Available




Radio HF V/UHF SATCOM
Interoperable
Air Vehicle






Navigation/Guidance INS GPS EGI
Launch Weapon on/near Target
Reliable
Minimize threat response time
Concept Alternatives
 
Figure 27: Concept Alternatives Analyzed against MOE (continued) 
The concept alternatives in Figure 26 and Figure 27 are by no means an exhaustive 
listing.  They signify common solutions that are extensively used throughout commercial and 
military systems.  These concept alternatives are further consolidated into final rating as seen 
in Figure 28.  Additional color coding was used to signify mixtures of green, yellow, and red 
in the original assessment.  For example, the “Propulsion/Powerplant/Air” concept 
alternative in Figure 27 had green and yellow ratings.  This averaged out to a ‘light’ green 
rating in Figure 28.  In addition, the “Weapons Subsystem/Non-Lethal/Electromagnetic” 
concept alternative had green and red ratings which averaged into a light orange color rating.   
This methodology for using color coding to differentiate various concept alternatives will be 
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Operating System Windows Unix Solaris
Data Storage Hard Drive Flash Drive CD/DVD
Weapons Subsystem (Anti-Surface)
Lethal rockets guns missiles
non-lethal visual audio electromagnetic
Surveillance Subsystem
Active RADAR IFF Sonar
Passive IR EO ESM
Command and Control Subsystem
Threat ID processing Operator (Visual) Database
Operator Interface Permanent Portable
Network
C2 Node Link-11 Link-16 IP
Air Vehicle Node Link-11 Link-16 IP
Propulsion
Power Plant jet propeller air
Fuel JP-5 Battery solar
Launch/Recovery Equipment
launch platform ship land oil platform
recovery platform ship land oil platform
Communication Subsystem
Radio HF V/UHF SATCOM
Air Vehicle
Airframe Rotary Wing Fixed Wing Lighter than air
Navigation/Guidance INS GPS EGI
Concept Alternatives
 
Figure 28: Consolidated MOE Analysis of Concepts 
C. MORPHOLOGICAL MATRIX 
Figure 28 was utilized in building a morphological matrix.  The morphological matrix 
was generated in order to ensure that all possible concept alternatives were taken into 
consideration and that the final configuration of the VULTURE system was maximized for 
effectiveness.   
The weapons, surveillance, propulsion, launch and recovery equipment, and air 
vehicle systems were all included in the morphological matrix.  However, the data 
processing, C2, network, and communication systems were not included in the morphological 
49 
matrix because the preferred solution was obvious based upon Figure 26, Figure 27, and 
Figure 28.  The best solution for data processing was UNIX and hard drive; for C2 it was 
database and portable; for network it was Link-16; and finally communication was high 
frequency, very/ultra high frequency, and satellite communication.   
The final morphological matrix indicated all of the possible combinations of sub-
components and produced over 39,000 concept alternatives.  The complete morphological 
matrix is too voluminous for this report but Appendix E contains screenshots of various 
sections of the matrix.   
Table 10 outlines 16 concept alternatives that are thought to best satisfy the measures 
of effectiveness.  The top 2 alternatives for fixed wing, rotary wing and lighter than air UAS 
platform types are indicated in Table 10. 
1. Overall Rating 
From Table 10, configurations #1 and #2 are the best “Fixed Wing” vehicles.  The 
best “Rotary Wing” vehicles are configuration #3 and #4.  Finally, the best “Lighter than 
Air” configurations are #5 and #6.  These top six configurations will be further assessed for 
risk in the next section. Ten additional alternatives that were thought to have some value 
were also included to facilitate a more complete performance rating and cost rating.   
Overall, the most significant grouping of concept alternatives is the “Rotary Wing” 
airframe type.  “Fixed Wing” vehicles have the next best rating followed by “Lighter than 
Air”.  A significant result is that the best “Fixed Wing” configurations use “Propellers” as the 
“Power Plant”.  Obviously, this configuration is important in order for all vehicles to be 
launched and recovered aboard the OPLAT.   
 Another interesting aspect of this analysis shows the “Battery” fuel source degrades 
the overall performance of any airframe that uses it.  Obviously, no “Jet” power plant would 
use the “Battery” as a fuel source; however, a “Propeller” driven “Fixed Wing” could.  These 
interrelationships appear rational. 
In conclusion, the morphological matrix process can produce rationale results while 
based upon subjective assignment of values by experienced VULTURE team members and 
feedback from SMEs. 
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Plant Fuel Launch Recovery Airframe
Navigation/
Guidance
1 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
2 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
3 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
4 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
5 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
6 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
7 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
8 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
9 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
10 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
11 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
12 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
13 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
14 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Air Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
15 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI





Top Lighter Than Air
 FW
Command and ControlData Processing
RW





2. Performance Rating 
Table 11 contains the performance assessment of the 16 configurations taken from the 
morphological matrix.  The colors (red, yellow, green) were assigned to each “Sub-
component” based upon how well the system components would achieve the MOEs.  Each 
component type was rated relative to each other.  These ratings were given based on the 
VULTURE team experience, feedback from SMEs, as well as interaction with users of 
similar systems and users of the individual components. 
For example, concept alternatives #1 and #2 in Table 11 are fixed wing aircraft using 
propeller propulsion systems.  Their effectiveness for deploying an “Audio” weapon system 
to achieve the MOE of “Threat Deterrence” is less than what could be accomplished by a 
rotary wing platform.  Therefore, “Audio” was colored red for fixed with but green for rotary 
wing.  Furthermore, fixed wing aircraft would have a moderate level (e.g. yellow) of 
performance recovering aboard an OPLAT since the OPLAT has limited surface space for 
landing.  Yet, all rotary wing airframes have good level (e.g. green) of performance for both 
recovery and launch from the OPLAT since they move vertically requiring minimal space.  
The middle portion of Table 11 simply assigned numerical values to the colors.  A 
higher value means better performance; therefore, green is 3, yellow is 2, and red is 1. 
The last portion of Table 11 includes a weighting scheme that is intended to depict 
how important each component is to at overall performance of the system.  For instance a 
sensor of any kind (active or passive) is more important than a weapon since the weapon 
cannot be used if a threat target cannot be identified, so it is weighted higher.  The weight for 
each component was multiplied by the numerical value assigned to it in the middle portion 
and the resulting products were summed for each concept alternative and listed in the last 
column.  These numbers will be used later to develop the cost vs. performance plot. 
Further refinement of these numerical ratings is recommended for follow-on 
investigation.  Specific performance levels should be investigated and documented using the 
House of Quality process discussed in chapter 3 of Blanchard & Fabrycky [5] along with the 
QFD 2 weightings.  For example, the “Weapons Subsystem” can be further decomposed into 
components that are either already in production or development.  Furthermore, specific 




• Effective range 
• Firing rate 
• Types of ordnance 
• Accuracy 
• Sighting controls 
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1 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
2 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
3 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
4 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
5 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
6 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
7 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
8 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
9 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
10 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
11 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
12 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
13 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
14 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Air Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
15 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
16 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Air Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
Concept 
Alternative



























1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
2 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
5 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
6 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
7 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3
8 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 3
9 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3
10 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 3
11 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3
12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3
13 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
14 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3
15 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
16 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3



























Weights 3 1 3 2 4 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 2
Concept 
Alternative Totals
1 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 9 9 4 12 6 124
2 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 9 9 4 12 6 124
3 9 3 9 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 9 9 6 8 6 128
4 9 3 9 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 9 9 6 8 6 128
5 6 2 9 4 12 8 15 9 4 9 9 9 6 8 6 116
6 6 2 9 2 12 8 15 9 4 9 9 9 6 8 6 114
7 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 6 9 9 4 12 6 121
8 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 3 9 4 12 6 118
9 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 6 9 9 4 12 6 121
10 9 3 3 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 3 9 4 12 6 118
11 9 3 9 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 6 9 6 8 6 125
12 9 3 9 6 12 12 15 9 6 9 6 9 6 8 6 125
13 6 2 9 4 12 8 15 9 4 9 9 9 6 8 6 116
14 6 2 9 4 12 8 15 9 4 6 9 9 6 8 6 113
15 6 2 9 2 12 8 15 9 4 9 9 9 6 8 6 114
16 6 2 9 2 12 8 15 9 4 6 9 9 6 8 6 111




3. Relative Cost Rating 
The 16 configurations shown in Table 10 were also subjectively assessed for cost, 
and the results are depicted in Table 12.  Again, the colors red, yellow, and green were 
assigned based upon the relative cost of the component type in relationship to each other.  
In this case green is again better than yellow which is better than red. 
A limitation to this cost rating is that actual costs were not utilized, as the team used 
only subjective comparisons.  These ratings were given based on the VULTURE team 
experience, feedback from SMEs, as well as interaction with users of similar systems and 
users of the individual components.  Since actual costs were not specifically identified, no 
dollar value or estimated fiscal year projection can be performed using this analysis 
methodology.   
One of the key aspects to assigning a cost rating is complexity.  For example, the 
column “Airframe” in Error! Reference source not found. shows the “Fixed Wing” as 
yellow, “Rotary Wing” as red, and “Lighter than Air” as green.  In relationship to each 
other, the “Lighter than Air” airframe is less complex than the other two types because it 
has the least number of moving parts.  Next complex airframe is the “Fixed Wing” since it 
creates lift on its wings vice using rotors and gearbox subsystems like the “Rotary Wing” 
airframe does.  Finally, the “Rotary Wing” airframe requires complicated flight controls 
along with strong, lightweight, and expensive materials like titanium in the rotors to 
survive the high stress and vibratory environment. 
Another perspective for cost rating is the level of difficulty integrating systems 
onboard these airframes.  For example, “Missiles” are more complicated to integrate on all 
the airframes than “Guns” because they require targeting information, launch commands, 
and self-contained guidance systems.  In addition, both “Missiles” and “Guns” are more 
difficult to integrate on a “Lighter than Air” airframe because of their explosive forces on 
its buoyancy properties; e.g., every action has an opposite and equal reaction. 
This process was similar to the performance rating, however, a lower cost is more 
desirable so when assigning numerical values in the middle section of Table 12, green is 1, 
yellow is 2, and red is 3. 
The last portion of Table 12 includes a weighting scheme that is intended to depict 
how price tolerant each component is to at overall cost of the system.  For instance an air 
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vehicle type selection is a requirement for the system to exist.  Since the air vehicle 
component is likely going to be the most expensive portion of the system, it is weighted as 
a 1 to indicate that even though it is expensive that is accepted and should not affect the 
cost analysis in any extreme way.  By contrast, the method of recovery is not as relevant to 
the overall mission and therefore is rated a 6 to indicate that an extreme expense in this area 
would not be recommended.  The weight for each component was multiplied by the 
numerical value assigned to it in the middle portion and the resulting products were 
summed for each concept alternative and listed in the last column.  These numbers will be 
used later to develop the cost vs. performance plot. 
Further investigation of actual cost values for these configurations is recommended.  
These data should be included with the performance values discussed previously. 
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1 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
2 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
3 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
4 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
5 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
6 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
7 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
8 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
9 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Jet JP-5 Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
10 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Fixed Wing EGI
11 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
12 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Rotary Wing EGI
13 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
14 UNIX Hard Drive Audio GUNS RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Air Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
15 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Propeller Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
16 UNIX Hard Drive Audio Missiles RADAR EO/IR Database Portable Link-16 Air Battery Oil Platform Oil Platform Lighter than Air EGI
Concept 
Alternative



























1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1
2 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1
3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
5 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
6 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1
8 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1
9 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1
10 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1
11 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 1
12 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 1
13 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
14 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
16 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1



























Weights 4 4 3 2 1 3 1 3 4 3 2 3 5 1 4
Concept 
Alternative Totals
1 4 4 9 2 1 6 1 3 4 6 2 6 10 2 4 64
2 4 4 9 4 1 6 1 3 4 6 2 6 10 2 4 66
3 4 4 6 2 1 3 1 3 4 6 2 3 5 3 4 51
4 4 4 6 4 1 3 1 3 4 6 2 3 5 3 4 53
5 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 6 2 3 5 1 4 72
6 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 6 2 3 5 1 4 72
7 4 4 9 2 1 6 1 3 4 9 2 6 10 2 4 67
8 4 4 9 2 1 6 1 3 4 6 6 6 10 2 4 68
9 4 4 9 4 1 6 1 3 4 9 2 6 10 2 4 69
10 4 4 9 4 1 6 1 3 4 6 6 6 10 2 4 70
11 4 4 6 2 1 3 1 3 4 6 6 3 5 3 4 55
12 4 4 6 4 1 3 1 3 4 6 6 3 5 3 4 57
13 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 6 2 3 5 1 4 72
14 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 3 2 3 5 1 4 69
15 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 6 2 3 5 1 4 72
16 8 8 3 6 1 9 1 3 12 3 2 3 5 1 4 69




D. RISK ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
From Table 10, concept alternatives 1 thru 6 have been identified as systems that 
could potentially satisfy the needs of the stakeholders.  As these were the top two 
alternatives per air vehicle type, the risk analysis was limited to these 6 (out of the 
available 16). The risk analysis was performed order to determine the feasibility of 
designing, producing, and fielding each of the 6 concept alternatives successfully. 
Three system level risks were identified and scored for each of the six concepts.  
The bulk of the design effort in the VULTURE program is envisioned to be related to the 
integration of multiple technologies into a single system.  Historical precedence has 
shown that integration is often a high risk area.  Therefore, all three system level risks is 
related to system integration. 
Risk 1 – Integration of Lethal Weapons:  Risk that the specified weapon (guns or 
missiles) cannot be successfully integrated onto the specified airframe (fixed wing, rotary 
wing, or lighter than air). 
Risk 2 – Integration of Non-lethal Weapons:  Risk that the non-lethal weapon (a 
focused noise device) cannot be successfully integrated onto the specified airframe (fixed 
wing, rotary wing, or lighter than air). 
Risk 3 – Integration of Airframe Type:  Risk that the specified airframe (fixed 
wing, rotary wing, or lighter than air) cannot be successfully integrated with operations 
based from the OPLAT. 
For each concept alternative, each of the three risks was evaluated for the 
probability of the risk being realized and for the consequence of the risk being realized.  
Furthermore, the consequence was scored in two ways; (1) technical consequence of 
degraded system performance, and (2) cost and schedule consequence that would impact 
the program.  At this early stage of project definition, it did not make sense to separate 
cost risk from schedule risk since the two will almost certainly be directly related. 
The method used for scoring the program risks was the standard set by the Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Risk Management Policy.  Risk is comprised of two 
components; likelihood and consequence.  Table 13 shows the likelihood criteria used to 
select the level of risk. 
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Table 13: Likelihood Criteria 
Level Likelihood Probability of Occurrence 
1 Not Likely ~10% 
2 Low Likelihood ~30% 
3 Likely ~50% 
4 Highly Likely ~70% 
5 Near Certainty ~90% 
 
The consequence criteria are shown in Table 14.  This table details the various 
levels of risk and the resultant cost from that risk.  Now that the morphological matrix 
narrowed the configurations down to six concepts alternatives as shown in Table 15.  The 
team scored them for risk as contained in Table 16.  A detailed description of the basis 
for each of these scores is located in the Risk Factor Calculations section. 
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Table 14: Consequence Criteria 
Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no consequence to technical performance Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no 
impact on program 
Able to meet key dates 
 
 
Slip < 1 month 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increases. 
 
< 1% of Budget 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical performance or 
supportability with limited impact on program 
objectives 
Minor schedule slip.  Able to 
meet key milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Slip < 2 months 
 
Sub-system slip > 1 month plus 
available float. 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increase 
 
< 5% of Budget 
4 
Significant degradation in technical 
performance or major shortfall in supportability; 
may jeopardize program success 
Program critical path affected. 
 
 
Slip < 6 months 
Budget increase or unit 
production cost increase 
 
< 10% of Budget 
5 
Severe degradation in technical performance; 
Cannot meet KPP or key 
technical/supportability threshold; will 
jeopardize program success 
Cannot meet key program 
milestones. 
 
Slip > 6 months 
Exceeds APB threshold 
 
 
>10% of Budget 
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Table 15: Concept Configurations 
Variant Airframe Lethal Weapon Non-lethal weapon 
Concept 1 Fixed Wing Guns Focused Noise Device 
Concept 2 Fixed Wing Missiles Focused Noise Device 
Concept 3 Rotary Wing Guns Focused Noise Device 
Concept 4 Rotary Wing Missiles Focused Noise Device 
Concept 5 Lighter than Air Guns Focused Noise Device 
Concept 6 Lighter than Air Missiles Focused Noise Device 
Table 16: Risk Score of Concepts 
 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 3 












Concept 1 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 
Concept 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 
Concept 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 1 4 3 
Concept 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 1 4 3 
Concept 5 4 3 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 
Concept 6 4 3 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 
Tech-Technical         
Cons - Consequence 
Sched - Schedule 
61 
To assess the relative risk of each concept the Risk Factor method was used.  For 
each concept the Risk Factor was calculated using the formulas shown in equations 1, 2, 
and 3.  For the consequence value, the greater of the technical consequence and the 
cost/schedule consequence values was used.  The detailed calculations for the risk factor 
ratings are shown in Appendix F. 
( )( )ff CPRiskFactor −−−= 111      Equation 1 
( )∑= obabilityPf Pr*α       Equation 2 
( )∑= eConsequencC f *α       Equation 3 
Table 17: Individual Concepts Risk Factor 
Variant Risk Factor 
Concept 1 76% 
Concept 2 79% 
Concept 3 74% 
Concept 4 74% 
Concept 5 79% 
Concept 6 79% 
 
The risk factors are all within 5% of each other, indicating that there is not a large 
variation in the amount of risk assumed by choosing any particular concept as opposed to 
another.  Although the variation is relatively small there is a trend showing that the 
“Rotary Wing” airframe may have some advantages over the other choices when it comes 
to the risk of development and integration. 
2. Detailed Risk Analysis  
The Risk Cubes shown in Figure 29 display the three risk ratings for each of the 
six concepts.  The cubes are followed by a description of each specific risk score and the 





































































































































Figure 29: Risk Cubes for the Various Platforms and Configurations 
 
Concept 1 
Risk #1 – Guns on Fixed Wing 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
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require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the guns cannot perform up to the expected potential (accuracy, 
range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the platform, there 
will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when performing the required 
mission. 
Probability: 2 – There has not been much work specific to integrating guns onto 
UASs, however other weapons have been integrated successfully.  The guns would be a 
mature technology and would likely be optically guided using the onboard EO/IR system.  
The EO/IR system would also be mature technologies, although the integration of it all 
together does pose some risk. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device (FND) on Fixed Wing  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
Probability: 3 – FND are typically used from stationary platforms.  Integrating 
one onto a fixed wing UAS will be moderately challenging due to the requirement of 
keeping the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of time.  Sensors, 
flight controls, and the FND will all need to be integrated together. 
 
Risk #3 – Fixed Wing on an Oil Platform  
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the UAS is unable to take off or land from the OPLAT 
an alternative would need to be developed.  Water based UAS have been designed so it 
would not be a brand new technology but would still pose some challenges which would 
increase program cost and schedule. 
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Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot land directly on the OPLAT it will need to be 
recovered from the water which will cause a significant impact to the time required for 
operations as well as create new requirements for the system to survive the environmental 
effects of a water landing. 
Probability: 2 – Fixed wing UAS with many different take off and landing 




Risk #1 – Missiles on Fixed Wing 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the missiles cannot perform up to the expected potential 
(accuracy, range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the 
platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when 
performing the required mission. 
Probability: 3 – Missiles have been implemented on Fixed Wing UAS before but 
the integration of this specific weapon, UAS, and sensors likely will have some technical 
challenges. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device on Fixed Wing  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
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Probability: 3 – FND are typically used from stationary platforms.  Integrating 
one onto a fixed wing UAS will be moderately challenging due to the requirement of 
keeping the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of time.  Sensors, 
flight controls, and the FND will all need to be integrated together. 
 
Risk #3 – Fixed Wing on an Oil Platform  
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the UAS is unable to take off or land from the OPLAT 
an alternative would need to be developed.  Water based UAS have been designed so it 
would not be a brand new technology but would still pose some challenges which would 
increase program cost and schedule. 
Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot land directly on the OPLAT it will need to be 
recovered from the water which will cause a significant impact to the time required for 
operations as well as create new requirements for the system to survive the environmental 
effects of a water landing. 
Probability: 2 – Fixed wing UAS with many different take off and landing 




Risk #1 – Guns on Rotary Wing 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the guns cannot perform up to the expected potential (accuracy, 
range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the platform, there 
will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when performing the required 
mission. 
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Probability: 3 – The task of integrating guns onto a rotary wing UAS will not be 
too much different from a fixed wing UAS, however not as much work has been done in 
this area so unexpected technical challenges are likely. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device on Rotary Wing  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
Probability: 2 – FND are typically used from stationary platforms.  Integrating 
one onto a rotary wing UAS will be more challenging due to the requirement of keeping 
the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of time as well as the need to 
integrate the FND closely with sensors and flight controls. 
 
Risk #3 – Rotary Wing on Oil Platform 
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If issues arise when integrating the rotary wing UAS with 
the OPLAT they will likely require a moderate level of engineering and design changes 
to expand the landing area or improve the flight control software.   
Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot take off and land from the OPLAT any 
alternative method developed would likely have a significant impact on operations. 
Probability: 1 – Rotary wing UAS have been fielded with the capability to take 
off and land from areas similar in size to OPLATs. 
 
Concept 4 
Risk #1 – Missiles on Rotary Wing 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
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require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the guns cannot perform up to the expected potential (accuracy, 
range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the platform, there 
will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when performing the required 
mission. 
Probability: 3 – The task of integrating missiles onto a rotary wing UAS will not 
be too much different from a fixed wing UAS, however not as much work has been done 
in this area so unexpected technical challenges are likely. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device on Rotary Wing  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
Probability: 2 – FND are typically used from stationary platforms.  Integrating 
one onto a rotary wing UAS will be more challenging due to the requirement of keeping 
the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of time as well as the need to 
integrate the FND closely with sensors and flight controls. 
 
Risk #3 – Rotary Wing on Oil Platform 
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If issues arise when integrating the rotary wing UAS with 
the OPLAT they will likely require a moderate level of engineering and design changes 
to expand the landing area or improve the flight control software. 
Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot take off and land from the OPLAT any 
alternative method developed would likely have a significant impact on operations. 
Probability: 1 – Rotary wing UAS have been fielded with the capability to take 




Risk #1 – Guns on Lighter than Air (LTA) 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the guns cannot perform up to the expected potential (accuracy, 
range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the platform, there 
will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when performing the required 
mission. 
Probability: 4 – LTA aircraft have never been equipped with weapons.  Typically 
an LTA does not have as much payload capability as a FW or RW aircraft of the same 
physical size.  Integration of weapons will likely be a large technically challenge. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device (FND) on Lighter than Air  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
Probability: 2 – Stationary platforms are the typical platform to incorporate a 
FND.  Integrating one onto a Lighter than Air UAS will be more challenging due to the 
requirement of keeping the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of 
time as well as the need to integrate the FND closely with sensors and flight controls. 
 
Risk #3 – Lighter than Air on Oil Platform (5,2) 
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Cost and Schedule: 2 – If issues arise when integrating the Lighter than Air UAS 
with the OPLAT they will likely require a modest level of engineering and design 
changes to the landing area or improve the flight control software.   
Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot take off and land from the OPLAT any 
alternative method developed would likely have a significant impact on operations. 
Probability: 2 – LTA aircraft typically have less control than rotary wing aircraft 
and therefore require a larger area to land.  High winds atop a seabased OPLAT will 
increase the landing challenges. 
 
Concept 6 
Risk #1 – Missiles on Lighter than Air 
Cost and Schedule: 4 – If the weapon cannot be successfully integrated a large 
schedule delay as well as large cost will be incurred as resolving integration issues will 
require technical teams from various disciplines (airframe, weapons, sensors, flight 
controls) and will likely require full scale testing. 
Technical: 3 – If the missiles cannot perform up to the expected potential 
(accuracy, range, number of rounds, lethality, etc) due to integration issues with the 
platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system capability when 
performing the required mission. 
Probability: 4 – LTA aircraft have never been equipped with weapons.  Typically 
an LTA does not have as much payload capability as a FW or RW aircraft of the same 
physical size.  Integration of weapons will likely be a large technically challenge. 
 
Risk #2 – Focused Noise Device on Lighter than Air  
Cost and Schedule: 3 – If the FND cannot be implemented successfully a 
moderate amount of rework will likely be required which will add some additional cost 
and schedule. 
Technical: 3 – If the FND cannot perform up to the expected potential due to 
integration issues with the platform, there will be a moderate degradation of total system 
capability when performing the non-lethal mission. 
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Probability: 2 – FND are typically used from stationary platforms.  Integrating 
one onto a Lighter than Air UAS will be more challenging due to the requirement of 
keeping the noise beam pointed at the threat for an extended period of time as well as the 
need to integrate the FND closely with sensors and flight controls. 
 
Risk #3 - Lighter than Air on Oil Platform 
Cost and Schedule: 2 – If issues arise when integrating the Lighter than Air UAS 
with the OPLAT they will likely require a modest level of engineering and design 
changes to the landing area or improve the flight control software.   
Technical: 4 – If the UAS cannot take off and land from the OPLAT any 
alternative method developed would likely have a significant impact on operations. 
Probability: 2 – LTA aircraft typically have less control than rotary wing aircraft 
and therefore require a larger area to land.  High winds atop a sea-based OPLAT will 





A. BANG VERSUS BUCK 
Results from the performance and cost ratings (Tables 11 and 12) were used to 
develop the cost versus performance graph in Figure 30.  Each of the 16 configurations is 
shown in the legend.  Performance levels increase on the ordinate, and cost increases on 
the abscissa.  In order to determine the best “bang for the buck”, a line is drawn outward, 
vertically from the ordinate and then lowered toward the first set of data points as shown 
in the blue and red lines on Figure 30.  The red line in Figure 30 depicts the best “Fixed 





























































Figure 30: Cost versus Performance 
Since the blue line intersects first with the group of data points, the “Rotary 
Wing” concepts are considered the best suited when considering cost vs. performance to 
meet the stakeholder’s needs.  The next best group of concepts is “Fixed Wing” followed 
by the “Lighter than Air” group.  Overall, this cost versus performance analysis shows 
that Configuration #3 is the best “Rotary Wing” airframe, Configuration #1 is the best 
Rotary Wing 
Fixed Wing 
Lighter than Air 
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“Fixed Wing” airframe and the “Lighter than Air” options were clustered too close 
together to determine a clear winner. 
 
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. Approach 
The capability needs statement indicates that a primary need is to efficiently and 
effectively neutralize surface threats to OPLATs.  The team’s interactions with 
stakeholders have also indicated that the ability of the UAS to maintain a persistent on 
station time is also a priority.  Therefore, the intent of the Microsoft Excel based 
Simulation, developed by our team, was to illustrate the trade-off between efficient and 
effective neutralization of surface threats and Persistent On-Station time. 
The following are baseline assumptions that were necessary to frame the 
simulation: 
• All the target tracks indicated in the simulation have been positively 
identified as threats (constant bearing, decreasing range to OPLAT) prior 
to them being acknowledged by the simulation (randomly generated 
threats with randomized start location and speed).  This course and bearing 
satisfied the simulations minimal ROE. 
• All UAS speeds and endurance times were taken from the Shepard 
Unmanned Vehicles Handbook [17]. 
• If the UAS reaches 0.5 miles of a target it is assumed it will be 
neutralized, there was no consideration to exhaustion of onboard stores. 
• The total simulated time was 24hrs. 
• Total simulated threats will not exceed 50 in a 24 hr period (this is likely a 
very high estimate, but threat saturation was the goal). 
The desired outcome from the simulation was to determine: 
• How many targets could be neutralized by the UAS. 
• When each UAS was no longer available (ran out of gas). 
 
The following UAS types listed in Table 18 were determined suitable for the mission and 
the ones highlighted yellow were actually simulated. 
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Table 18: Suitable OPLAT defense UAS models 
 UAS Name Type Status Max Speed (Knots) Endurance Speed (Knots) Endurance Time (Hrs) Country Shepard Handbook Page
APID 55 RW Production 54 32 6 Sweden 8
Shadow 200 FW  Production 123 75 5.5 USA 30
TAG M100 RW Development 81 66 5.7 USA 65
TAG M65 RW Development 59 54 4.5 USA 66
Firescout RW Production 125 50 6 USA 13
Seascan FW  Production 63 43 15 USA 29
Sentry FW  Production 95 70 6 USA 30
Vigilante 502 RW Production 117 50 7 USA 36
ISIS FW  Development 104 69.5 24 USA 52
SA‐90 LTA Development 40 40 48 USA 60  
 
There is a mix of production UAS systems as well as developmental UAS 
systems.  The team could only find one Lighter Than Air (LTA) system and it was under 




Table 19: OPLAT defense UAS Simulation results 
 Shadow 200 TAG M100 Firescout ISIS SA‐90A/V Max Speed A/V Max Speed A/V Max Speed A/V Max Speed A/V Max Speed
123 81 125 104 40
A/V Endurance Speed  A/V Endurance Speed  A/V Endurance Speed  A/V Endurance Speed  A/V Endurance Speed 
75 66 50 69.5 40
A/V Endurance Time A/V Endurance Time A/V Endurance Time A/V Endurance Time A/V Endurance Time
330 342 360 1440 2880
A/V Time Remaining A/V Time Remaining A/V Time Remaining A/V Time Remaining A/V Time Remaining
‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 0
Sum of all time at max Speed Sum of all time at max Speed Sum of all time at max Speed Sum of all time at max Speed Sum of all time at max Speed
106 123 91 454 1440
Total time at endurance speed Total time at endurance speed Total time at endurance speed Total time at endurance speed Total time at endurance speed
157 192 133 761 1440
Am I available?/Time of Not Available Am I available?/Time of Not Available Am I available?/Time of Not Available Am I available?/Time of Not Available Am I available?/Time of Not Available
No No No No No
Total Operating Time Total Operating Time Total Operating Time Total Operating Time Total Operating Time
264 316 225 1216 1440 
Note: Input Parameters are highlighted in yellow. 
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Clarification of the simulation results are tabulated in Table 20.  These results 
were further analyzed. 
















Shadow 200 4.40 2.27 0.23 11 54.55 50
TAG M100 5.27 2.47 0.19 14 59.24 50
Firescout 3.75 2.13 0.27 9 51.20 50
ISIS 20.27 2.02 0.30 47 48.55 50
SA‐90 24.00 1.88 0.21 50 45.00 50 
 
Table 20 clearly indicates that the UAS system that is most efficient at 
neutralizing threats is the TAG M100 Rotary Wing option with nearly 2.5 threats 
neutralized per hour of operation and only 0.19 targets actually reaching the OPLAT per 
hour of operation.  Conversely the SA-90 LTA option can only neutralize 1.88 threats per 
hour of operation and the ISIS Fixed Wing option neutralizes 2.02.  The ISIS was even 
worse when considering that 0.30 targets reached the OPLAT per hour of operation.  
However, this is only in the context of actual operating time.  When the options were 
analyzed with regard to the entire 24 hour simulation period the results are a bit different.  
The on station time of the LTA was the best (up to 48 hrs) so it stayed airborne for the 
entire simulation.  All the rest of the options ran out of fuel prior to the 24 hour limit.  At 
this point, some interpolation was undertaken to determine that if the other options were 
available for the 24 hour period (refuel and/or a second same type UAS system was 
utilized) how good their respective neutralization numbers would be.  Using the results of 
this interpolation it was determined that if the TAG M100 could remain on station for 24 
hours (likely via the use of multiple UAS systems) then it could in theory neutralize over 
59 randomly occurring threats.  This is well over our simulated threat level of 50 per 24 
hrs so it is reasonable to think that few if any threats would make it to the OPLATS 
before being neutralized.  The Firescout UAS would also be satisfactory. 
2. Limitations 
The simulation was set up in such a way that it took just over 30 minutes to 
produce a single iteration of the program.  As such, the results of the simulation are not 
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statistically significant, but some basic conclusions can be determined as noted above.  
The ideal solution would be to run the simulation 100 or more times and average the 
results to foster a deep statistical analysis.  Given time constraints this was not possible to 
produce for the report, but the simulation is available if more detailed analysis is 
required. 
There is also the possibility that the first instance of a target in the simulation 
could be at or near the OPLAT.  This is not realistic but was difficult to design out of the 
simulation.  As such it is accepted as possible reason for skewed results (the target would 
reach the OPLAT before it could even be pursued by the UAS). Such instances should 
not be counted against any UAS system but in this case they may have been. 
3. Conclusion 
Taking both on station time and efficiency of neutralization into account it seems 
like a “Rotary Wing” airframe solution is the better option.  The TAG M100 is a good 
example of such a solution; however it is currently under development.  It may be too 
risky to pursue an unproven solution, so the Fire Scout UAS would be an acceptable 
second choice since it is more proven technology.  Either way, multiple rotary wing air 
vehicles (2 or more) should be procured to maximize on station time and allow at least 
one vehicle to be on station while the other is refueling or reloading weapons.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SELECT PREFERRED CONCEPT ALTERNATIVE 
The “Rotary Wing” airframe was selected as the preferred concept from the 
analyses previously discussed in this report.  The reasons for this selection include: 
• Satisfactorily meets the defined requirements and related MOE’s as 
indicated by the morphological matrix results. 
• Best performance for the dollar as indicated in “bang versus buck” 
analysis. 
• Marginally better risk as determined by the risk analysis. 
• Superior operational capabilities as revealed by modeling and simulation.   
Specifically, the TAG M100 may be a UAS worth further investigation.  At the 
writing of this report, it is still under development.  Another UAS of similar concept is 
the MQ-8B Fire Scout UAS.  The MQ-8B Fire Scout [18] is an unmanned autonomous 
helicopter developed for use by the United States armed forces to provide 
reconnaissance, situational awareness, and precision targeting support.  Since a “Rotary 
Wing” airframe would provide the best solution, the data in Table 21 would be excellent 
source of information to apply cost estimating relationships to further refine life cycle 
cost estimates for the VULTURE system.  Performance levels to assist in developing cost 
estimating relationships are contained in Table 22. 
Table 21: Fire Scout Life Cycle Costs 
Cost Type TY$M 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) 530.3 
Procurement 1,821.5 
Military construction 126 
Acquisition operating & maintenance 309.3 








Length 23.95 ft 
Wingspan - 
Height 9.71 ft 
Empty weight (lb) 2,073  
Maximum Takeoff Gross weight (lb) 3,150  
Range (nm) 110 
Endurance 8 hours 
Service ceiling (ft) 20,000  
Maximum Speed 115 knots 
Payload Weight 600 lbs 
Rotor diameter 27.5 ft 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The VULTURE system was de-scoped from the original start of the project so 
only the surface vessel threat was assessed.  Consideration of other types of threats could 
result in different type of system or systems earning the top performance. 
In this research study, the VULTURE system was analyzed strictly as an 
OCONUS UAS.  To operate in CONUS would require various laws and modifications 
outside the scope of this analysis. 
The VULTURE system architecture was developed using the Vitech CORE 6.0 
software program.  This is an excellent software tool, which was effectively used to 
identify top-level functions and then decompose them into lower levels.   
The morphological matrix process can produce rational results.  We were able to 
base our proposed systems on subjective assignment of values by experienced 
VULTURE team members and feedback from SMEs. 
Most of the analysis in this report focused on a suitable air vehicle type to support 
the OPLAT defense mission and ideally minimize the manpower footprint.  While the 
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preferred air vehicle is indicated above along with supporting reasons, there are other 
components that will make up the VULTURE system.  Based on research there was some 
established research space devoted to a sensor sub-system and a command and control 
sub-system.  Recommendations in these areas can be reviewed via the following 
documentation: 
• Sensor: Market Survey for NAVAIR PMA-263 Sea Scout Program [15] 
• Command and Control: Proposed Functional Architecture and Associated 
Benefits Analysis of a Common Ground Control Station for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems [16]. 
The simulation indicates that in order to maximize on station time and mitigate 
threats to the OPLAT, multiple (2 or more) UAS vehicles should be procured per oil 
platform being defended. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Listed below are the eight recommendations suggested by the VULTURE team.  
The eight recommendations can be divided into three areas of focus.   The first would be 
current operations of the fleet performing infrastructure protection and UAS utilization.  
The second area and highest priority would be regarding a programmatic focus on 
utilizing this report with the updated information developed through an actual program of 
record.  This includes but is not limited to values for the MOEs, a more detailed cost 
estimate, and further utilization of the functional architecture.  The third and final area 
focuses on the future or long-term goals of implementation of the VULTURE system; 
these include the possibility of foreign military sales and development of robust rules of 
engagement. 
1) Conduct future research regarding the sensitive nature of infrastructure 
protection abroad and how it can be improved with the utilization of a UAS. 
2) Analyze current UAS operations to ensure that incorporation of the UAS will 
avoid growth in footprint with respect to logistics or manpower. 
3) Develop values for the metrics assigned to the MOEs. 
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4) Investigate the viability of making a VULTURE system available for foreign 
military sales. 
5) Perform future design efforts that utilize the functional architecture to 
accomplish the following tasks: (1) Develop a failure modes and effects 
analysis showing loss of functions; (2) Identify diagnostics requirements to 
monitor safety critical functions; (3) Determine critical operational issues for 
evaluation during testing; and (4) Allocate operation of the function to either 
hardware, software, or human. 
6) Investigate specific performance levels and document them using the House 
of Quality process. 
7) Conduct a more detailed cost estimate as the system is developed, and 
determine cost estimating relationships for various UAS performance levels. 
8) Develop rules of engagement using responsible and mature criteria to 
minimize mistakes in identification and possible engagement of friendly 
contacts mistakenly targeted as threats. 
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APPENDIX A ACRONYMS 
Ao   Operational Availability 
AoA   Analysis of Alternatives 
APB   Acquisition Program Baseline 
C2   Command & Control 
C3   Command, Control & Communication 
C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computing & 
Intelligence 
CCJO   Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 
COA   Concept of Alternative 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
CONUS  Continental United States 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DoD Department of Defense 
EFFBD  Enhanced Functional Free Block Diagram 
EO/IR   Electro Optical / Infra Red 
FND   Focused Noise Device 
FW   Fixed Wing 
ID   Identification 
IDEF   Integration Definition for Function Modeling 
IMP   Integrated Master Plan 
IMS   Integrated Master Schedule 
IPR   Interim Project Review 
IPT   Integrated Product Team 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
JCA   Joint Capabilities Area 
JFC   Joint Functional Concept 
JIC   Joint Integrating Concepts 
JOC   Joint Operating Concepts 
JOpsC-DP  Joint Operations Concept Development Process 
KPP   Key Performance Parameter 
LTA   Lighter Than Air 
MEG-2  Maritime Expeditionary Group 2 
MOE   Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP   Measure of Performance 
MOS   Measure of Suitability 
MRL   Manufacturing Readiness Level 
MSSE   Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
MTBF   Mean Time Between Failure 
NAVAIR  Naval Air Systems Command 
NAWCAD  Naval Air Warfare Command Aircraft Division 
NECC   Naval Expeditionary Combat Command 
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NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
OCONUS  Outside the Continental United States 
OPLAT  Oil Platform 
O&S   Operations and Support 
Pk   Probability of a Kill 
PMA   Program Management Activity 
QFD   Quality Function Deployment 
RDT&E  Research Development Test & Evaluation 
ROE   Rules Of Engagement 
RW   Rotary Wing 
S&T   Science & Technology 
SAR   Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SE   Systems Engineering 
SME   Subject Matter Expert 
STUAS  Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System 
SYSCOM  Systems Command 
TEMP   Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TPM   Technical Performance Measure 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System(s) 
UCAS-D Unmanned Combat Air System- Demonstration 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
UNTL Universal Naval Task List 
US United States 
VULTURE Variable Mode Unmanned long Range tracking Unit for 
Reconnaissance & Elimination 
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APPENDIX B TEAM MEMBERS 
Table 23: VULTURE Team Project Members 
Name NAVAIR position Team Position 
Bartolomeo, Peter 4.1.8.2 Risk Assessment and Analysis 
McCartney, William 5.1.6.4 Integration and Continuity 
Nixon, Rebeca  4.1.1.1 Deputy Project Manager, and Alternatives 
Plessinger, Jack  4.1.8 Technical Performance, IMP and IMS 
Tebbano, Andrew 5.1.2.4 Project Manager, Modeling and Simulation 
Westervelt, Kerry 4.1.1.3 Architecture, Mission Analysis, and Cost 




APPENDIX C MISSION ANALYSIS DEFINITIONS 
1. Joint Operations Concepts Definitions 
CCJO: Overarching concept that guides the development of future joint force 
capabilities. It broadly describes how the joint force is expected to operate 8-20 years in 
the future in all domains across the range of military operations within a multilateral 
environment and in collaboration with interagency and multilateral partners.  
JOCs: Applies the CCJO solution in greater detail to a specified mission area, and 
describes how a joint force commander, 8-20 years in the future, is expected to conduct 
operations within a military campaign.  
JFCs: Applies elements of the capstone concept for joint operations solution to 
describe how the joint force, 8-20 years in the future, will perform an enduring military 
function across the full range of military operations, and identifies the operational-level 
capabilities required to support the full range of military operations. Also determines any 
additional military capabilities required to create the effects identified in JOCs. 
JICs: Operational-level description of how a joint force commander, 8-20 years in 
the future, will perform a specific operation or function derived from a joint operating 
concept and/or a joint functional concept. They are narrowly scoped to identify, describe, 
and apply specific military capabilities, decomposing them into fundamental tasks, 
conditions, and standards. 
Based upon this concept, the VULTURE team intends to define the mission 
supporting the objective of developing an affordable technology based solution to protect 
and defend sea based OPLATs from terrorist attack. 
2. Joint Capabilities Areas 
DoD has adopted JCAs as its capability management language and framework as 
explained in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G [19].  JCAs 
are collections of DoD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, 
strategy development, investment decision making, and capabilities-based force 
development and operational planning.  A list of all JCAs can be found at 
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http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/.  The JCA associated with meeting the objectives 
of the VULTURE system is “Protection”.  Protection is defined as the ability to 
prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel (combatant/non-combatant) and 
physical assets of the United States, and allies.  The definition for each element is 
provided in paragraph 3, and they were obtained from the J7 Joint Force Development 
and Integration Division website [20].  Of the JCAs in Figure 31, only item “7.1 Prevent” 
and its sub-elements apply to the VULTURE system. 
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 7. Protection 
     
7.1 Prevent  
7.1.1  Prevent Kinetic Attack  
7.1.1.1  Above (PK) 
7.1.1.1.1   Maneuvering (PKA) 
7.1.1.1.2   Non-Maneuvering (PKA) 
7.1.1.2  Surface (PK) 
7.1.1.2.1   Maneuvering (PKS) 
7.1.1.2.2   Non-Maneuvering (PKS) 
7.1.1.3  Sub-surface Kinetic (PK) 
7.1.1.3.1   Maneuvering (PKSS) 
7.1.1.3.2   Non-Maneuvering (PKSS) 
7.1.2  Prevent Non-kinetic Attack  
7.1.2.1  Above Surface (PN) 
7.1.2.2  Surface (PN) 
7.1.2.3  Sub-Surface (PN) 
7.2 Mitigate  
7.2.1  Mitigate Lethal Effects  
7.2.1.1  Chemical (ML) 
7.2.1.2  Biological (ML) 
7.2.1.2.1   Contagious (MLB) 
7.2.1.2.2   Non-contagious (MLB) 
7.2.1.3  Radiological (ML) 
7.2.1.4  Nuclear (ML) 
7.2.1.5  Electro Magnetic Pulse (ML) 
7.2.1.6  Explosives (ML) 
7.2.1.7  Projectiles (ML) 
7.2.1.8  Directed Energy (ML) 
7.2.1.9  Natural Hazards (ML) 
7.2.2  Mitigate Non-lethal Effects  
7.2.2.1  Chemical (MN) 
7.2.2.2  Biological (MN) 
7.2.2.2.1   Contagious (MNB) 
7.2.2.2.2   Non-contagious (MNB) 
7.2.2.3  Electro Magnetic Pulse (MN) 
7.2.2.4  Explosives (MN) 
7.2.2.5  Projectiles (MN) 
7.2.2.6  Directed Energy (MN) 
7.2.2.7  Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (MN) 
7.2.2.8  Natural Hazards (MN) 
7.3 Research and Development  
7.3.1  Basic Research  
7.3.2  Applied Research  
7.3.3  Advanced Technology Development  
Figure 31: Protection JCA Elements 
3. Protection JCA Definitions 
1  Protection – The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel 
(combatant/non-combatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies and friends. 
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1.1 Prevent – The ability to neutralize an imminent attack or defeat attacks on 
personnel (combatant/non-combatant) and physical assets. 
1.1.1 Prevent Kinetic Attack – The ability to defeat attacks being delivered by 
systems which rely upon physical momentum. 
1.1.1.1 Above Surface (PK) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered 
attacks in air and space. 
1.1.1.1.1 Maneuvering (PKA) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered 
attacks that can change speed, direction or altitude based on internal or external guidance. 
1.1.1.1.2 Non-Maneuvering (PKA) – The ability to defeat kinetically 
delivered attacks that cannot change speed, direction or altitude based on internal or 
external guidance. 
1.1.1.2 Surface (PK) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered attacks on the 
exterior or upper boundary of the land or water. 
1.1.1.2.1 Maneuvering (PKS) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered 
attacks that can change speed or direction based on internal or external guidance. 
1.1.1.2.2 Non-Maneuvering (PKS) – The ability to defeat kinetically 
delivered attacks that cannot change speed or direction based on internal or external 
guidance. 
1.1.1.3 Sub-Surface Kinetic (PK) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered 
attacks beneath the surface of the earth (bunkers, basements, tunnels, caves, etc.) or 
beneath the surface of a body of water. 
1.1.1.3.1 Maneuvering (PKSS) – The ability to defeat kinetically delivered 
attacks that can change speed, direction or depth based on internal or external guidance. 
1.1.1.3.2 Non-Maneuvering (PKSS) – The ability to defeat kinetically 
delivered attacks that cannot change speed, direction or depth based on internal or 
external guidance. 
1.1.2 Prevent Non-kinetic Attack – The ability to defeat attacks being delivered 
by systems which do not rely upon physical momentum. 
1.1.2.1 Above Surface (PN) – The ability to defeat non-kinetically delivered 
attacks in air and space. 
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1.1.2.2 Surface (PN) – The ability to defeat non-kinetically delivered attacks 
on the exterior or upper boundary of the land or water. 
1.1.2.3 Sub-Surface (PN) – The ability to defeat non-kinetically delivered 
attacks beneath the surface of the earth (bunkers, basements, tunnels, caves, etc.) or 
beneath the surface of a body of water. 
1.2 Mitigate – The ability to minimize the effects and manage the consequence of 
attacks (and designated emergencies on personnel and physical assets. 
1.2.1 Mitigate Lethal Effects – The ability to minimize the effects of attacks or 
designated emergencies which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical 
assets. 
1.2.1.1 Chemical (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of chemical 
attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.2 Biological (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of biological 
attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.2.1 Contagious (MLB) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
contagious biological attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy 
physical assets. 
1.2.1.2.2 Non-Contagious (MLB) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
non-contagious biological attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy 
physical assets. 
1.2.1.3 Radiological (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of radiological 
attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.4 Nuclear (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of nuclear attacks 
which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.5 Electromagnetic Pulse (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
electromagnetic pulse attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy 
physical assets. 
1.2.1.6 Explosives (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of explosive 
attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
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1.2.1.7 Projectiles (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of projectile 
attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.8 Directed Energy (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of directed 
energy attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.1.9 Natural Hazards (ML) – The ability to minimize the effects of natural 
hazards which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2 Mitigate Non-Lethal Effects – The ability to minimize the effects of attacks 
or designated emergencies which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy 
physical assets. 
1.2.2.1 Chemical (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of chemical 
attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.2 Biological (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of biological 
attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.2.1 Contagious (MNB) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
contagious biological attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and 
destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.2.2 Non-Contagious (MNB) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
non-contagious biological attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and 
destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.3 Electromagnetic Pulse (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of 
electromagnetic pulse attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and 
destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.4 Explosives (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of explosive 
attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.5 Projectiles (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of projectile 
attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.6 Directed Energy (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of directed 
energy attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical 
assets. 
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1.2.2.7 Electromagnetic Spectrum (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects 
of electromagnetic spectrum attacks which do not have the potential to kill personnel and 
destroy physical assets. 
1.2.2.8 Natural Hazards (MN) – The ability to minimize the effects of natural 
hazards which do not have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets. 
1.3 Research and Development – The ability to conduct fundamental research, 
science, technology, development and experimentation important to all Departmental 
capabilities and operations 
1.3.1 Basic Research – The ability to conduct a systematic study directed toward 
the discovery of knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena 
and of observable facts without specific applications. 
1.3.2 Applied Research – The ability to conduct a systematic study to understand 
the means to meet a recognized and specific need. 
1.3.3 Advanced Technology Development – The ability to produce innovative 
and unique components and prototypes that can be integrated into defense systems for 
field experiments and/or tests in a simulated "or operational" environment "to assess 
military utility" prior to full development. 
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APPENDIX D VULTURE ARCHITECTURE DETAILS 
The further decomposition of the VULTURE IDEF 0 diagram (shown in Figure 
21) is detailed in an IDEF level 1 diagram shown in Figure 32, Figure 33, Figure 34, 
Figure 35 and Figure 36.  It shows the tier 2 level functions and their interrelationships.  
Inputs and outputs from the system are identified along with the signals passed between 
the various functions.  It is very similar to the N2 diagram except the inputs and outputs 
are better illustrated along with the interconnecting lines.  Furthermore, the physical 
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Figure 33: Maintain On-Station Presence IDEF1 Diagram 
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Figure 36: Neutralize Surface Threat IDEF1 Diagram 
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APPENDIX E MORPHOLOGICAL MATRIX SAMPLE 
The morphological matrix is too large a file to include in its entirety.  To avoid 
inundating the reader to a 39,366 row matrix excel sheet (493 page pdf) the following 
three pages are included to give a taste of the permutations that took place. 
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Figure 39: Image Capture of a portion of the Morphological Matrix cont. 
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 Capability Need Statement
 The VULTURE concept is expected to meet the need to provide real time 
situational awareness for the purpose of persistent and effective defense of Oil 
Platforms against conventional and/or unconventional threats.
 Key Requirements and Capabilities
 The system must be an affordable solution
 Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
 Capability to engage and destroy threats
 Sustainment strategy that is both affordable and feasible for operations 
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Variable-mode Unmanned Long-range Tracking Unit for 




































































































































APPENDIX G IPR 2 SLIDES 
 
IPR #2 
Versatile Unmanned Long-endurance Tracking 




























Variable-mode Unmanned Long-range Tracking Unit for 
























 Global terrorist threats targeted at oil production and distribution 
facilities are a clear and present danger. As evident in the current 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico caused by accident, a deliberate 
attack by a determined enemy can cause significant environmental
and economic damage to the United States or its allies and the 
global economy.
 Therefore, an urgent need is required for the capability to provide 
continuous, all-weather, autonomous protection of domestic and 






 Problem Statement: Due to the limitations of on-platform ISR 
capability,  there is a limited early positive ID capability of possible 
threats which does not allow for timely and efficient protection of the 
Oil Platform prior to a hostile event.
 Capability Need Statement: There is a need to maximize the 
surveillance and positive identification capabilities regarding 
possible surface threats while also minimizing the manpower 







 Initial Research – conducting mission analysis, developing scenarios, 
concept of operations, and identifying the customers and stakeholders of 
the system
 Problem Formulation – Stakeholder interviews, requirements generation, 
functional architecture, and component development.
 Analysis of Alternatives – Developing alternatives to compare against cost, 
performance and risk.
 Synthesis – Simulation and recommendation
 Status of Project Phases
 Initial Research and Preliminary Problem Formulation (IPR1)  
 Rescoped Proposal, Continued Problem Formulation, and began Analysis 
of Alternatives (IPR2)
 Synthesis (still to complete)
 The project was rescoped to focus on Surface Threats only (eliminated 
subsurface and airborne). 6  
 
Revised Research Questions
 What functions, subsystems, and components will be required for 
the VULTURE system to achieve the ability to detect, engage and 
neutralize surface threats in a time-critical environment and allow 
for successful defense of an Oil Platform?
 What Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) should be used to 
determine the value of the VULTURE system to perform its 
intended mission?
 What Measures of Suitability (MOS) should be established to 
ensure successful operation in intended environment?
 How do we judge success? (Number of successful attacks vice 
thwarted attacks / total attacks,  lack of surface threats to be





 Small watercraft < 50 ft
 Max speed < 40 knots
 Max personnel < 25
 Most Likely Threat
 Small innocuous looking boat laden with explosives and suicide 
crew such as that employed against USS Cole
 Most Dangerous Threat
 Fast moving, low signature vessel capable of carrying a large 
amount of explosive materials that could result in irreparable 






 Day, night, or low-visibility (rain/fog)
 Sea state: < 4
 Clouds/Precipitation (limited visibility)
 To limits of sensors
 Winds: < 35 knots
 Ambient Air Temperature: 0 – 120 F
 Icing: Operations permitted into forecast 
or known trace or light icing conditions
 Day or Night






 Multiple Oil Platforms
 Available Maritime / Aviation Assets
 Distance from shore











 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
 CDR Gary Lauck, N9  (S&T) COMNECC
 Charlie Sullivan, Maritime Expeditionary Group 2 (MEG-2) 
 CDR John Anderson, N3 (Man, Train, & Equip)




 LT Col John Neville, IPT Lead, STUAS
 STUAS – Small Tactical Unmanned Air Systems








• Decomposed user requirements in CORE 6.0
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• Decomposed user requirements in CORE 6.0
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• Decomposed user requirements in CORE 6.0
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Developing a Traceable Top Level System 
Design Approach
 Customer Survey
 Extracts relative importance of top level requirements from customer
 Pairwise Comparison
 Normalizes customer rankings to determine most important 
requirements
 Quality Function Deployment (QFD) 1
 Aligns system requirements with system design characteristics
 QFD 2
 Aligns system design characteristics with system level functions
 QFD 3





Relative ranking of top level system requirements by 















Relationship of System Design Characteristics to 






Relationship of Top Level Functions to 
System Design Characteristics






Relationship of Physical Subsystems to Top 
Level Functions
Concentrate resources on the most critical 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Operating System Windows Unix Solaris
Data Storage Hard Drive Flash Drive
Hardware COTS Legacy
Weapons Subsystem            (Anti-Surface)
Lethal rockets guns missiles
non-lethal visual audio electromagnetic
Surveillance Subsystem
Active RADAR
Passive IR EO ESM
Command and Control Subsystem (ISR)
Navigation/Guidance INS GPS EGI
Operator Interface Permanent Portable
Network
C2 Node Link-11 Link-16
Air Vehicle Node Link-11 Link-16
Propulsion
Power Plant jet propeller air solar
Fuel JP-5 Battery
Launch/Recovery Equipment
launch platform ship land oil platform Air Platform
recovery platform ship land oil platform
Communication Subsystem
Radio HF UHF VHF
Air Vehicle






Analysis of Alternatives Plan
 Rate Concept Alternatives relative to each other based on MOE/MOS 
metrics
 Based on research, known performance, or technical perception
 A Morphological Matrix will be developed to determine the best 
combinations of alternatives
 These combinations will then be rated for integration difficulty (risk) and 
cost as an independent variable (CAIV)
 A Cost versus Performance plot will fall out that should identify the 
most “bang for buck” combination of alternatives









 Refined Scope of project
 Solicited input from stakeholders
 Developed Requirements, MOEs/MOSs, Functions and 
Components




 Began Analysis of Alternatives




 Continue Analysis of Alternatives
 Obtainable (technical maturity)?
 Cost Analysis
 CAIV


















 Overall, the VULTURE design should meet the following 
high level needs:
 Provide situational awareness around sea-based assets at 
distances sufficient to neutralize detected surface threats.
 Perform ISR alert function and will, when appropriate, monitor 
and engage threats.
 Process data to provide a knowledge base for the operational 
forces and commanders so that they can make informed 
decisions.








 SIO810 March 11, 2010 Program Management Plan
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